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Competitive Tendering is currently viewed by many as a panacea for the economic 
problems of public transportation services. Competitive tendering is believed to reduce 
costs, increase productivity, decrease subsidies, induce better quality, stimulate 
innovation, and to further the modal share of public transport. The European 
Commission advocates competitive tendering as a means to stimulate competition in 
public transport and as an important additional step towards the goal of an internal 
European market for transportation services.  
The present special issue of European Transport assembles five articles which review 
the experience of those European countries that have the greatest experience with 
competitive tendering so far, namely the UK, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. To these 
European countries the overseas perspective of Australia has been added, because the 
failure of the public tender in Melbourne has received widespread interest among 
experts.  
Basically the papers show that no easy answers and – what is even more important – 
no standard answers emerge. Competitive tendering will not deliver economic gains per 
se. Context and history matter. Moreover, there are some serious inherent pitfalls in 
competitive tendering that have to be avoided. Finally, it is not clear, in how far 
competitive tendering can replace regulation (as contended in Demsetz classical article 
of 1968) or whether there must still be constant monitoring of the winning bidder. It is 
also unclear whether improved regulatory mechansisms could achieve the same 
efficiency results as competitive tendering, but perhaps at less transaction cost.  
Concerning the role of context Boitani/Cambini point out the importance of the 
political framework conditions. The two authors present new original data from which 
they conclude that the Italian experience with the tendering of bus services has been 
disappointing so far. The number of participants in the tendering proceses has been very 
low in most cases and the incumbent won the tender almost everywhere. There has been 
no convergence of cost levels (as should be expected with a well known production 
technology like in bus transport) and the cost savings that have been achieved have been 
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small. The authors conclude that for the devlopment of cost levels past cost levels seem 
to be more decisive rather than competitive tendering.  
The authors emphasize the importance of the “political economy context” for the 
tendering procedure to be successful. Legal and political uncertainties create 
disincentives for potential market entrants to participate. Such uncertainties may arise 
when there is suspicion of favoritism on the part of the tendering authorities, for 
instance, when their own transport enterprises are involved or when tenders seem to be 
tailor-made for the incumbents.  
Regulations are another key element of the political context. In Italy there exist social 
clauses which stipulate that the winner of an auction has to re-employ the staff of the 
former incumbent. Considering that labor costs amount to approximately 2/3 of total 
operating cost this is a very important factor for the efficiency gains that can be 
achieved via a tender.  
Boitani and Cambini believe that public tendering can only be successful when the 
following three preconditions can be met: (1) there must be credible commitment on the 
part of the franchisor to let franchisees go bankrupt, (2) the authorities must be able to 
guarantee fair tenders, possibly by an independent agency, and (3) there must be free 
choice of the factors of production. The authors argue that if these requirements are not 
achievable in the policy process other mechanisms like subsidy capping or yardstick 
competition will be preferable. 
The importance of history and the political context is also apparent from the paper on 
Norwegian bus services tendering by Bekken et al. The authors show that in Norway the 
efficiency gains that have been achieved by competitive tendering are primarily a 
function of previous contractional arrangements. The authors carry out an econometric 
analysis to study the effect of competitive tendering on costs, subsidies, and vehicle 
kilometers. The cost savings amount to approximately 10 %, which is less than in other 
countries, even other Scandinavian countries like Denmark and Sweden. The paper 
explains these low efficiency gains by the fact, that in Norway private involvement has 
already been substantial previous to the opening up of this market to competitive 
tendering. In Norway a great share of bus services has traditionally been provided 
through negotiated net cost contracts with private firms. Public operation was limited to 
major cities. As a result cost savings in Norway were already in the order of 6-20% 
before competitive tendering was introduced. This raises the question, of course, what 
gave the private firms the incentives to achieve these gains, given that they had a de 
facto monopoly position. Bekken et al. attribute this to the fact that these firms were 
operating under the constant threat of competitive tendering. 
Bekken et al. report that the Norwegian counties have preferred to cash in the 
efficiency gains of competitive tendering in the form of reduced subsidies rather than in 
the form of increased service quality, apparently without great loss in patronage. A 
further interesting result achieved in the paper is that counties with a mixed regime 
(partly tendering, partly negotiated contracts) have fared less well in terms of cost 
reduction and output than counties which exclusively have kept to negotiated contracts 
or exclusively moved to competitive tendering. The authors conjecture that this can be 
explained by the fact that the threat of competitive tendering breaks the trust 
relationship established with the operating firm and the purchaser. As the prolongation 
of the existing contract becomes less likely firm behave more according to the actual 
length of the contract. The horizon of investments will be shortened and risk aversion 
increases.  
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The paper by Stanley fits rather well to the main result by Bekken et al. In Melbourne 
too, large efficiency gains had been achieved before the city decided to put out its public 
rail services to tender. As a result it could have been predicted by the bidders and the 
franchisors alike that the potential for further gains was low. The opposite occurred 
however and rather optimistic bids were made and accepted by the authorities.  
In August 1999 Melbourne split its rail services into four parts, two heavy and two 
light rail (tram) operations which were to be put out to tender. (There was also one 
regional passenger service which was tendered too) The idea behind this construction 
was to allow yard-stick competition between different transportation firms. National 
Express Group (NEX), the British Bus Operator, won the franchise to operate one of the 
two metropolitan train services and one of the two metropolitan tram services. The other 
metropolitan train service was awarded to Connex and the other tram service to Yarra 
Trams. The contract length was set at 12 years for the tram services and at 15 years for 
the train services. Already in early 2002, after only three years of operation, all 
franchisees reported financial problems. The government responded with substantial 
short term funding. Nevertheless, a few months later National Express stopped 
operations. After interim arrangements with the two remaining companies in the market 
Connex finally took over the whole train network and Yarra Trams the entire tram 
network in 2004. The contract lengths were shortened from 15 to 5 years.  
Stanley attributes the failure of the Melbourne tender to several factors. Among these 
are overoptimism of the bidders, as mentioned above. The bidders were influenced in 
their expectations by the substantial growth rates in the British transport sector and did 
not realize that in Melbourne further cost cutting would be difficult. But Stanley also 
mentions other problems like the poor performance of the existing ticketing system and 
unsatisfactory security around rail stations. Stanley conjectures, however, that these 
factors are only part of the explanation. In his view the real causes lie deeper and point 
to a major problem in competitive tendering in general. Invoking ideas from the so 
called Capture Theory of the Positive Theory of Economic Regulation Stanley claims 
that the bidders were quite conscious of the fact that their bids were unrealistic. Their 
market entry was aimed at “getting a foot in the door” and “creating facts” for the 
regulatory authorities who would find it politically difficult to let the bidders go 
bankrupt. Instead of incurring the political troubles connected with service disruptions 
the authorities would rather grant fare increases to the troubled companies. This 
hypothesis raises the objection, of course, why reputation effects do not counteract such 
strategic behaviour. Moreover, as Stanley himself recognizes, competent regulators 
should immediately recognize unrealistic bids and see through the strategic intentions of 
the bidders.1 Stanley claims, however, that in the Melbourne case due to a mixture of 
ignorance and ideological preconception the responsible decision-makers were not able 
to assess the bids in a realistic fashion. He concludes his paper by spelling out key-
elements of what he terms a “trusting partnership” between the State and private 
operators in transport service planning and delivery.  
The two remaining papers in this special issue of European Transport deal with 
Sweden and Great Britain, respectively, the two countries that have certainly 
accumulated the greatest experience in competition in public transport services so far.  
Alexandersson and Hulten give an overview over the experience in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Their focus is on railway services. Since the 
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Transport Policy Act in 1988 the Swedish railway sector has a vertically separated 
structure, where investments and maintenance of railway infrastructure are the 
responsibility of Banverket, a public enterprise. At the level of train operation the 
former state railway operator SJ competes with new entrants, like Connex, Citypendeln 
and Tagkompaniet. The County Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) act as 
responsible agencies for regional services and are compensated by the state for deficit 
making services.  
New entry was slow in Sweden at first. From 1989 to 1995 there was only one single 
competitor to SJ, BK Tag. The break-through did not occur before 2000. Alexandersson 
and Hulten attribute the break-through to the increased transparency that had gradually 
improved after more and more functions like allocation of track access rights (slots) and 
train traffic control had been moved from SJ to Banverket, the network operator. This 
created safety for investors and new entrants, like Connex, Citypendeln and 
Tagkompaniet which are now strong competitors of SJ.  
Alexandersson and Hulten report that competitive tendering of railway services in 
Sweden has led to subsidy reductions in the order of 20% in the first round and an 
additional 28% in the second round of tendering by CPTAs. There has also been an 
increase of 32% in patronage - on short distances even of 70%! This means stronger 
growth than for all other modes and can probably not be attributed to tendering alone. 
Alexandersson and Hulten mention better integration with bus-services by the CPTAs 
as a major success factor. 
Compared to these successes of public tendering in Sweden there are some negative 
aspects too. The average number of bidders has been rather low. It amounted to 1-2 
bidders for net cost contracts (which are mainly used for the regional services tendered 
by the CPTAs) and 2-3 bidders for gross cost contracts (which are mainly used for 
interregional services tendered by the state). There were also several cases of non-
fulfilment of contracts due to too optimistic bids, the best known case being the 
problems with Stockholm’s commuter services in 2000. 
Great Britain has certainly been the country that has gained the most publicity for its 
far reaching experiments with competition in public transport. Concerning the railways 
most observers agree that after some initial reductions in the subsidies to the TOCS, 
subsidies now are almost back to the initial level before the reform. Alexandersson and 
Hulten even speak of a “cost explosion” in Great Britain’s railroad sector, not only with 
respect to train operations (the level of the TOCS) but also with respect to infrastructure 
and rolling stock. Many of the TOCS seem to be in serious financial trouble. The big 
success of the British rail reform undoubtedly lies in the substantial increase in 
patronage that has occurred.  
Britain has employed both competition in the market (open access) and competition 
for the market. Indeed this distinction was coined in Great Britain already in the middle 
of the 19th century by Chadwick, long before 1968 when Demsetz published his classic 
article “Why Regulate Utilities?” on which the modern philosophy of public tendering 
is based. (It is very little known, by the way, that the concept of competition for the 
market was developed even earlier than Chadwick by the German railway politician 
Hansemann in 1831) The paper by White contends that the intensity of competition is 
stronger in tendered services than in services which are characterized by “on the road or 
on the track” competition” White attributes this to the many potential alternative 
providers which are waiting in the wings to replace an unsatisfactory incumbent. With 
the large experience gained in the tendering of bus and rail services in Britain there is a 
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large supply of potential and knowledgeable market entrants with ensuing competitive 
pressure on incumbents. In contrast, it may be far more difficult to replace an incumbent 
by “on the road-competition” who may have developed a monopoly position over long 
years of operation.  
In his general conclusions White also casts an aside on the Melbourne case mentioned 
above. White conjectures that the failure may be due to an inherent deficiency of using 
net cost contracts. In his view net cost contracts run the danger of doubling the “winners 
curse” problem of auctions. This is because overoptimism can not only occur with 
respect to costs but with respect to revenues too. It may therefore be advisable to use 
gross cost contracts rather than net cost contracts. As British examples he cites the two 
Virgin rail franchises which too were based on very optimistic forecasts of large 
ridership and revenue growth. He admits, hower, that in growing markets, the effect of 
doubling the winners’ curse may be less important. In growing markets bidders may be 
able to spread the risk over larger networks rather than single routes. But even in this 
case there may be a point for gross contracts. Gross contracts may help to increase the 
number of bidders because there is less risk to be taken by the bidders. Thus more small 
enterprises may be encouraged to participate in the tender. White also shows that price 
competition in long distance markets has been more effective than in local markets. 
In conclusion it seems safe to say that uncritical optimism with respect to tendering of 
public transport services has given way to a more realistic assessment. It has become 
clear that “one size fits all” solutions are no longer appropriate. Success or failure in this 
area depend very much on history and on political circumstances which require careful 
and thorough ex ante analysis. The role of experience and learning by both authorities 
and bidders can hardly be underestimated. In addition, many theoretical issues still seem 
to be underresearched. This applies in particular to the strategic aspects of the bidding 
process and concerns perhaps more the institutional and political economy aspects of 
the matter than, for example, deficits in pure auction theory (see also Kain, 2006).  
On the empirical side I can possibly do no better than to cite the last sentences in the 
Alexandersson/Hulten paper: 
“We see at least two major possibilities for future empirical research. Firstly, a 
comparative European study directed towards measuring the effects of competitive 
tendering and testing the relative contribution of different factors, such as network size, 
number of bidders, contract length, how many times the services have been tendered, 
type of contract (net or gross cost), upstream competitive markets or vertical monopoly, 
and so on. Secondly, research projects including both statistical and qualitative data, 
comparing railway systems using competitive tendering to railway systems using either 
negotiated contracts or a monopoly regime. Such a study could shed some light on the 
relative merits of the different regimes after nearly two decades of experimentation with 
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During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure to procure and 
organise passenger railway services in European Union member countries. Different models have been 
developed in different countries, spanning from the British radical privatisation and franchising of the 
railway services to the more incremental processes in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Germany. The variety of tendering models has occurred for a number of reasons. For example, EU 
legislation permits different models of organising tenders, member countries have had different goals 
with the introduction of tenders and other reforms, and within countries we find trial-and-error processes 
aiming at reducing earlier flaws. In this article we will describe the dominating tendering procedures, look 
into their theoretical rationale and discuss their possible pitfalls and advantages, drawing from the 
experiences of several countries. It is evident that the different tendering regimes suffer from different 
types of problems. In the Swedish tenders there have often been very few competing firms, in Britain the 
long time span of the first round of franchised contracts resulted in difficulties in making correct 
estimates of future developments etc. The article concludes with an overall appraisal of the different 
models and explores the possibilities for learning across the tendering regimes. 
 




The process of “Europeanisation”, the creation of European institutions and markets, 
of the former national economies in Europe, has increasingly affected the competition 
policy in the union’s member states (see e.g. Vickers, 2001, Morgan, 2001, and Dabbah, 
2003). Public procurement by competitive tendering is an important part of these 
policies. It is supposed to increase competition, save taxpayers’ money and safeguard 
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equal treatment for competing firms, regardless of nationality (European Commission 
1996). The European transportation industry, not least the railway sector, has been 
particularly affected by this development, implying important structural changes in 
several countries. The European Directive 91/440 on the separation of accounts for 
infrastructure from operations has commonly functioned as a starting point for railway 
reforms, although specific problems and events at the national level have also played an 
important role. An overview and interpretation of how far rail liberalisation has 
progressed in the countries of the European Union is provided in reports of the so-called 
rail liberalisation index (Kirchner, 2004). 
This article begins with a broad look at some of the theories related to the introduction 
of regulatory reforms such as tendering in the railway sector. We then turn to the 
evolution of railway policies at the European Union (EU) level, followed by a closer 
look at the development in four EU member states: Sweden, Great Britain, Germany 
and the Netherlands. For each country, we look into the rationale and reasons behind the 
reforms, the process and history of the reforms, and the structure of the reforms (vertical 
and/or horizontal disintegration, use of tendering and contracts, types of contracts and 
their lengths etc). We also consider the experience in terms of the number of bidders, 
new entry, transparency, positive effects and particular problems, and how problems 
have been solved. In an analysing section we make an overall appraisal of the different 
models and explore the possibilities for learning across the tendering regimes. The 
paper ends with our conclusions and a look at possible ways forward. 
 
 
Theoretical approaches to railway reforms 
 
Theories on public and private ownership and PPP 
 
Privatisation refers to the transfer of public ownership and management to the private 
sector. Since privatisations are often the effect of a market transition that originates in a 
deregulation, the words deregulation and privatisation are sometimes mistakenly used as 
synonyms. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991) privatisation of former public 
enterprises and services can take three forms: 
1. Privatisation of competitive firms – the transfer to the private sector of state-owned 
enterprises operating in competitive markets. 
2. Privatisation of monopolies – transfer to the private sector of state-owned 
enterprises with substantial market power. These firms can either be natural monopolies 
(like electricity transmission) or “artificial” monopolies, where competition from 
foreign or domestic firms could exist. 
3. Contracting out of publicly financed services, previously performed by public 
sector organisations. 
The economic motives for privatising a public monopoly compared to replacing a 
public monopoly with competition are quite different. There is a widespread agreement 
that the replacement of a public or publicly guaranteed private monopoly with 
competition between competing firms results in improved efficiency. The efficiency 
gains are less clear for the transfer of a public monopoly to private ownership. In this 
case, it seems that the regulatory policy is crucial for preventing negative effects of 
monopoly power (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Alexandersson et al, 1998). One must 
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also consider the distinction between productive and allocative efficiency. Competition 
generally fosters gains in productive efficiency, for example through increased labour 
productivity, while a transition to a state of better allocation of resources and optimum 
output may be less straightforward and take longer time (see e.g. Preston, 1996). 
Some monopolised markets may be better suited to the introduction of competition for 
the market (for example by means of tendering), rather than competition in the market. 
In theory, this is advantageous when some resources of production are fixed or 
otherwise limited in terms of capacity, making them difficult to be used by more than 
one firm at a time (for example a time slot in a railway time table), when there is a need 
for coordinated planning of production in order to make use of network effects, and 
when many competing companies would create a fragmentised and possibly irregular 
supply over time – making it difficult for consumers to get the necessary information. 
The special circumstances related to contracting out and the selection of a winning bid 
entail some specific problems that are rarely observed on ordinary markets. The 
procuring entity has a strong position as a buyer, sometimes close to a monopsonist. It 
determines the range and limits of the actual market. A supplier that wins a tendered 
contract enjoys a monopoly-like position during the contract period, but its actual 
powers are often very restricted, e.g. in terms of its possibilities to influence prices and 
supply. The end consumers are bound to use the supplier chosen by the procuring entity. 
The contracting out of public passenger railway services may lead to a large variety of 
contracts, ranging from relatively simple and short-term management contracts to 
complex and long-term concession agreements. At a general level, they all imply the 
introduction of one form of public-private partnership. Public-private partnerships and 
their regulation is one of the recurring policy themes in the history of the transport 
industries (Estache and Serebrisky, 2004). In the European railway sector, tendered 
service contracts span from one to fifteen years, while the contracts of some Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects may run for 50 years and sometimes even longer. This 
means that actual competition between firms for a specific part of the market only takes 
place at discreet points in time, affecting the continuity of the seller structure, and 
thereby competition, over time. Even if other public tenders, concerning other parts of 
the market, may happen during these years, a loss in a tender that represents a major 
part in a firm’s business may lead to the dismantling of the firm altogether. It may be 
argued that firms that are efficient in the long run would always have the alternative to 
borrow money. However, this option does not seem to be realistic in situations when 
firms need to survive long periods of no or much reduced business activity, with only a 
chance (not certainty) to win a future tender. 
According to Bennett et al (1999) service contracts are generally the most competitive 
form of “privatisation”. They provide a relatively low risk option for expanding the role 
of the private sector, and the awarding procedure can help governments gain a more 
complete understanding of their infrastructure systems. Service contracts have potential 
to provide better system operation, allowing the government to obtain improvements in 
performance and efficiency through technology transfer and the acquisition of technical 
and/or managerial capacity. Since the contracts are reissued rather frequently, 
contractors should be under continuous pressure to keep costs low. Also, because 
service contracts are limited in scope, the barriers to entry should be fairly low. 
The disadvantages of service contracts are that they do not involve significant 
infusions of private capital, nor do they necessarily create a base from which to optimise 
entire infrastructure systems. In consequence, the contractor’s effectiveness in 
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improving the service performance is limited by the government’s ability to provide the 
necessary capital investments and direction. Another potential disadvantage is that 
service contracts leave the government in charge of many of the most explosive political 
issues and do little to separate the operator from political intervention. 
Long-term contracts like BOT projects can be an effective way to bring private 
money into the construction of new infrastructure facilities or into the substantial 
renewal of existing ones. BOT agreements tend to reduce market and credit risks for the 
private sector because the government is the only customer, reducing the risks 
associated with insufficient demand and ability to pay. Private actors will avoid BOT 
projects if the government is unwilling to provide assurances that the private sector 
investment will be paid back (Bennett et al, 1999). 
 
 
Scale economies, natural monopolies and contestable markets 
 
In the railway industry, presupposed scale economies in production, marketing, 
purchasing and co-ordination, for a long time implied that the provision of vertically 
integrated railway services was by definition viewed as a “natural” monopoly (see for 
example Beesley and Littlechild, 1992). Today, it is primarily the rail infrastructure that 
continues to be viewed as having characteristics of being a natural monopoly, forming 
the basis for vertical separation of infrastructure from operations as applied in several 
European countries. However, there is a persistent debate concerning the merits of 
vertical separation versus integration. Preston (1996) shows that the economic evidence 
for vertical separation is not entirely convincing. For example, there may be economies 
of scope related to vertically integrated planning of infrastructure and operations. It is 
possible that some scale economies in the European railway sector, which might have 
been possible to exploit before, are no longer available due to asset stripping and 
separation of previously integrated businesses and lines. Some researchers have 
therefore argued that vertical separation should never have been applied at all (see e.g. 
Bruzelius, 1998). 
In addition to the discussion on the pros and cons of vertical separation, there has also 
been a long-lived debate concerning the importance of various types of scale economies 
in railway operations. Empirical evidence from the U.S. suggests that there are constant 
returns to scale, but increasing returns to density in the railway sector. In other words, a 
railway company may only gain from running more trains on its existing network of 
lines, rather than both increasing the number of trains and expanding the network. 
Studies performed in Europe provide a more complex picture. According to Preston 
(1996), there are important economies of scale in network operation, but there is 
probably also an optimal size above which diseconomies set in. The smallest operators 
in Europe are affected by increasing returns to scale, the medium-sized operators 
experience constant returns and the largest appear to be affected by decreasing returns 
to scale. However, almost all railway companies, regardless of size, exhibit increasing 
returns to density (Preston, 1996). There are several possible sources to these 
economies, for example, increased amounts of services may lead to better use of 
terminal facilities, rolling stock and labour. But in the end, these economies may reach a 
point where they get exhausted and diseconomies of scale start to become apparent. 
This may be due to increased agency costs as companies become very large and 
possibly more difficult to manage and control. 
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It is important to note that this discussion on scale economies is limited to the effect 
of size upon variable costs. If demand-side complementarities are weighted in, such as 
co-ordinated timetables and marketing, the case for large railway companies probably 
gets stronger. However, very large firms may also have greater difficulties than small to 
respond quickly to shifts in customer needs. 
While most U.S. railroads are focussed on freight, European railways have 
traditionally been involved in both passenger and freight operations. This raises the 
question of economies of scope between passenger and freight operations. Although 
empirical findings are not entirely consistent, there is evidence of diseconomies of 
scope from studies on European as well as Japanese railways, suggesting that passenger 
and freight services may gain from being separated (Preston, 1996). 
The existence of scale economies in railway operations has sometimes been used to 
defend a regulatory framework that maintains a close-to-monopoly position of national 
operators in some European countries. But it has also been argued that scale economies 
are not automatically being advantageous to these operators. Rather, they need to be 
exploited, and firms may very well differ in their skills to do that. Large incumbents, 
lacking intra-modal competition for a very long time, may previously have experienced 
a rather limited pressure to rationalise their operations, especially if it was easy to get 
additional subsidies from the Government or other public authorities (Alexandersson et 
al, 2000). In theory, the introduction of a more open and competitive market should 
reveal the true economies of scale, enabling the most efficient firms to grow to their 
optimal size.  
To some extent related to the discussion on scale economies, we find an important 
theory development regarding how competition influences markets. With studies of the 
preconditions for when monopoly firms may actually be good for society, Baumol and 
other researchers came to formulate a theory on a new type of idealised market, the 
contestable market. Such a market is characterised by possibilities for easy and fast 
entry and exit of firms, which should all be affected by the same regulatory framework 
and have equal access to market knowledge and technology. Scale or scope economies 
may exist, but this is not a necessary condition. Sunk costs, rather than scale economies, 
make up the barrier to entry that gives a monopolist harmful power. The implications 
are that an industry may be efficient even in the case of a monopoly or oligopoly, 
provided that the threat from future competition is considered to be real. Regulations 
should therefore aim at facilitating entry and exit (Baumol et al, 1982). Shires et al 
(1994) have studied the British railway industry from a contestable market approach, 
finding some conditions to be fulfilled, but easy and fast entry and exit is still limited by 
several types of barriers, categorised as innocent, strategic or predatory. 
 
 
Transaction cost theory 
 
The costs to carry out transactions depend on the frequency of the transaction, 
uncertainty, the degree of specificity in the investments, and the perceived need to 
insure against opportunistic behaviour in markets with few actors. As can be understood 
from these factors, any change in a market structure may result in opposite forces as 
regards the transaction costs. A reduced uncertainty in the price level when using the 
market can be off-set by co-dependence between buyers and sellers if there is a high 
degree of investment specificity. 
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When the former railway monopolies were dismantled in countries like Great Britain 
and Sweden, transactions that used to be managed internally were moved to a market 
with sellers and buyers. This type of shift has been interpreted in two contrasting ways 
by researchers. One group claims that the horizontal and vertical disintegration resulted 
in lower transaction costs because the transactions were made visible and exposed to 
market mechanisms. One of the architects behind the privatisation of British Rail 
claimed that the separation of large vertically integrated firms into smaller specialised 
units lead to positive effects in terms of increased specialist knowledge of these firms 
(Foster, 1994). This division implied that a number of new contracts between the units 
had to be set up. Although the number of transactions in the system may have increased, 
the argument from this interpretation of transaction cost theory was that this does not 
necessarily imply higher transaction costs. In addition to the argument that transparency 
makes the transactions efficient, it has also been claimed that modern methods of 
management and control, auditing and computerisation decrease the costs of every 
transaction and make it easier to formulate the division of responsibility in contracts. 
Therefore, a clear separation of businesses into separate firms is necessary. 
It is important to note that one precondition of this line of reasoning is the exposure to 
market mechanisms, which is not always easy to achieve, and has even been forgotten 
in some regulatory reforms involving disintegration. When splitting large railway 
companies into smaller units, some of them may become monopoly firms (such as 
providers of railway stations). Moreover, it can be argued that learning and efficiency 
gains are also linked to having several customers with partly different needs. If the 
companies of the new system are only serving the very same divisions as before – and 
perhaps only one each – the gains from separation could turn out to be minor at best. 
Another potential concern is that if the monopoly is broken up into many sub-markets 
for inputs as well as for operations, the post-deregulation industry may contain so many 
firms in each market that transaction costs will inevitably increase. For example, the 
British railway industry was broken up into more than 80 firms. To reduce the potential 
risks associated with breaking up a monopoly one may consider to increase the size of 
the average tendered business operation and to construct upstream markets that are not 
so specialised – for example by merging different activities into one market.  
Some of those that oppose the idea of lowered transaction costs highlight the high 
asset specificity in the railway sector. They suggest that there is no such thing as an 
optimal way of organising competition in industries that have to rely on (monopoly) 
network facilities, and there is now a growing concern that the wrong design of the 
industry’s basic structural framework may have been chosen in the early days of the 
European regulatory reforms (Hultkrantz et al, 2005). One possible source for 
increasing transaction costs that may be more important than gains from competition is 
the misalignment of the mode of organisation. Misalignment refers to an arrangement in 
which the characteristics of the mode of organisation do not fit the attributes of the 
transaction it has to organise. This problem can occur in any new market constructed 





In a competitive tender in the European passenger railway market, a firm or a 
consortium may make promises about supplying a service at a defined quality level for 
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either a subsidy or against payment. Therefore, using competitive tendering when 
contracting out public services is similar to performing common value auctions with a 
sealed-bid procedure. However, the price of the bidders may not be the only factor 
(although often the most important) to take into account. The procuring public authority 
typically evaluates the competing bids regarding both price and quality once the bidding 
process has ended. Hence, competitive tenders combine traits, advantages, 
disadvantages and risks, of both auctions and beauty contests. Hultkrantz and Nilsson 
(2001) claim that a pure auction is better than a beauty contest because it offers a more 
market-oriented, objective and transparent method for awarding licences. Their 
strongest argument in favour of auctions is that firms in the auction process, by means 
of offering more and more money, reveal information about their estimation of the value 
of the good. Hultkrantz and Nilsson (2001) point out several disadvantages with beauty 
contests: 1) the process is slow and cumbersome, in particular if the final decision is 
challenged in court, 2) it is difficult to achieve transparency, and 3) many criteria are 
not objective or difficult to quantify. They further suggest that, even when social 
concerns are important, an auction is a better alternative since it can also include 
minimum requirements and can allow both positive bids in attractive regions and 
negative bids in unattractive regions. 
Auctions also present some notable risks and potential disadvantages. In many 
auctions, as well as in many competitive tenders, firms have made unrealistically 
optimistic forecasts about future revenues and costs. In auction theory, the concept of 
winner’s curse is used to explain why winning bids may be based upon judgmental 
failures. In particular, common value auctions – in which the participating bidders value 
items differently based upon their judgment of uncertain prospects – tend to be won by 
the bidder with the most optimistic estimate of the item’s value (see e.g. Kagel and 
Levin, 1986). Adnett (1998) discusses winner’s curse in relation to such tendering 
procedures. He argues that a low number of bidders, and in particular if they are 
inexperienced as in the first round of tendering in a certain business, will increase the 
importance of winner’s curse in competitive tenders. One way to limit the problem of 
winner’s curse is to alter the auctioning procedure. An open English auction, in which 
the bidders continuously follow the bids of their rivals, may stimulate aggressive 
bidding but yet decrease the risk of too optimistic bids and the related winner’s curse 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). However, there is an increased risk of collusion in open 
auctions (see e.g. Robinson 1985). It should also be noted that winner’s curse in tenders 
of public services may also be related to the bidders’ attitude towards risk, for example 
their view of whether the government will be willing to bail them out or renegotiate the 
contract if they fail. 
 
 
The development of a common European Union railway policy 
 
The European Directive 91/440, on the separation of accounts for infrastructure from 
operations, was one of the earliest initiatives of the European Community regarding 
reforms in the railway sector. This directive has sometimes functioned as a starting 
point for railway reforms in the Community member states. In countries where 
tendering of railway services have been introduced, general EU directives on public 
procurement and European competition law have also played an important role. 
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Gradually, the European Union has developed a political agenda to promote the 
advancement of the railways. 
The current overall objectives of the European Union railway policy are (Lundström, 
2004; European Commission, 2001, 2002): 
1. Create a common market for railway transportation services. 
2. Achieve operational compatibility in order to overcome the different technical 
standards of the member states. 
3. Create a common market for railway material and equipment. 
4. Create equal conditions for competition between different modes of transportation. 
5. Support a sustainable development by means of stimulating modes of transportation 
that have less (negative) environmental impact (such as railway and sea transportation). 
In recent years, the European Commission has increased the efforts to make these 
goals more tangible, expressed by its work on several “railway packages”. The first 
railway package was accepted in 2001 following three years of negotiations. It included 
the decision to open up international freight services on a specified network of lines or 
corridors in 2008. Also, it would no longer suffice to separate infrastructure from 
operations only on the accounting level. The second railway package was agreed upon 
in the spring of 2004. In order to hurry on with liberalisation of the international freight 
services within EU, this part of the market was to be opened for entry on January 1, 
2006 (instead of 2008). In 2004, the European Commission also presented its proposal 
on a third railway package. An important part of this package is that the international 
passenger services within the European Union are to be opened up to competition no 
later than January 1, 2010. All companies that fulfil safety regulations and several other 
demands will then have open access to the railway infrastructure. This also includes the 
possibility of cabotage, i.e. that the market of one country is open for actors based in 
another member state. 
In parallel to the development of the railway packages, there has been a long on-
going process to reform the old Community regulation 1191/69, aiming at providing a 
coherent framework for when and how passenger services may be subsidised or given 
exclusive rights. The current regulation (latest revised in 1991 by regulation 1893/91) 
says nothing on market opening or how to award public service contracts. The 
development in several European countries during the 1990’s, with the introduction of 
competitively tendered rail services and the rise of international railway operators, has 
highlighted the need for a new regulation. For several years, such a regulation has been 
in the pipeline (see van de Velde, 2005b, for an extensive review). In 2005, the 
European Commission presented its third proposal. In this, it is established that all 
exclusive rights or compensations for any public service obligations must be established 
within a framework of a public service contract, defining clearly the obligations and 
geographical areas concerned and the parameters for calculating the compensation 
(European Commission, 2005). While previous proposals have been favouring almost 
compulsive competitive tendering for the award of public service contracts, the latest 
one takes a much less dogmatic view. There is now a possibility for authorities to 
provide public services by themselves, or to award them directly to an internal operator. 
Specifically, all regional and long-distance rail services are exempted from any 
obligation to be tendered, i.e. they may also be awarded directly. However, the 
possibility to award contracts directly comes with a limiting reciprocity rule, implying 
that the operator must not engage in other passenger transport activities outside the 
awarded territory.  
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In all, the current proposal for a new regulation on the award of public service 
contracts is not exactly in line with the efforts to further liberalise the European railway 
sector as proposed by the Commission’s third railway package. Existing public service 
contracts in one country may limit the possibility of cabotage, and, if used deliberately 
as a national policy, may even close off countries entirely from rail competition. It 
remains to bee seen if the reciprocity rule (that may dampen this effect) will really be 
enforced. Moreover, there seems to be an uncertainty about the exact border between 
the applicability of the new regulation versus the directives on public procurement, 
being dependant on whether certain procured services are to be viewed as “concessions” 
or “service contracts”. 
In yet another line of development, the European Commission has also taken a closer 
look at the development of different forms of Public-Private Partnerships in the member 
states. In 2004, a Green Paper was published, in order to stimulate a discussion on how 
to apply EU regulations to PPP projects, specifically concerning the choice of private 
partners (European Commission, 2004). One conclusion was that there is no proper 
definition of PPP at the EU level and no common legislatory framework, giving 
member states a rather large degree of freedom as long as the Treaty’s principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination are followed. The feedback following from the 
Green Paper will probably lead to suggestions from the European commission on new 
regulations, at least concerning the award of PPP concessions. 
 
 




Origin and process. British Rail (BR) started to be criticised in the 1970’s for low 
productivity, inefficient management and ever increasing subsidies (Pryke & Dodgson, 
1975). In the early 1980’s BR experienced a severe financial crisis, forming the 
background to the work of the so-called Serpell committee. In its report, it was argued 
that major closures were necessary to reduce the need for subsidies (Serpell, 1982). 
Partly due to political concerns, BR was instead reorganised into several commercially 
oriented business sectors. This seems to have led to a remarkable improvement in BR’s 
productivity during the 1980’s. Nevertheless, from 1983 and onwards, several 
academics and right-wing thinkers argued for rail privatisation. In 1988, the politician 
John Redwood presented an overview of four alternative models for railway 
deregulation/privatisation being under consideration: 1) Privatisation of BR as a single 
unit, 2) Splitting of BR into several regional independent units, 3) Splitting of BR based 
upon its main business sectors, and 4) Separation of railway infrastructure from 
operations. Providing the advocates of rail privatisation with useful arguments, was the 
research on contestable markets, transaction cost economics, and the deregulation of the 
US railways sector. Other important influences were the EC directives aiming at 
opening up the railways to competing operators and Sweden’s vertical separation of 
infrastructure from operations and introduction of competitive tendering on regional 
lines (Alexandersson et al, 1997). 
When BR’s financial situation once again deteriorated in the early 1990’s, the search 
for an appropriate form of privatisation was intensified (Nash and Preston, 1993). In 
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July 1992, the Conservative Government presented a White Paper that set out six policy 
intentions to be achieved by April 1997 at the latest: 1) To sell British Rail Freight and 
Parcels to the private sector; 2) To establish a Franchising Authority and to franchise a 
substantial number of passenger services; 3) To restructure British Rail to own and 
operate track and infrastructure separately from operations; 4) To establish rights of 
access for new operators to the rail network; 5) To establish an independent Regulator; 
and 6) To provide opportunities for the sale or leasing of stations.  
The stated aims behind the railway privatisation reform was to make “better use of the 
railways, [to ensure] greater responsiveness to the customer, [to achieve] a higher 
quality of service and better value for money for the public who travel by rail” (OPRAF, 
1995, p. 29). The economic rationale was developed in more detail by the special 
adviser on rail privatisation, Sir Christopher Foster (Foster, 1994). He took the principal 
view that rail privatisation would achieve greater economic efficiency due to the 
superior incentives provided by the private sector. 
The White Paper was followed by a number of more specific documents from the 
Department of Transport and finally resulted in the passing of the Railways Act in 
November 1993. The Act laid the ground rules for the privatisation of British Rail, 
setting out the regulatory and statutory conditions under which this process, beginning 
in April 1994, could be undertaken. The company Railtrack was created by the Act, 
having as its key purpose to own, maintain and develop Britain’s mainline rail 
infrastructure. The decision to have a single rail infrastructure owner was based upon 
the belief that this part of the railway business bears the characteristics of a natural 
monopoly. In November 1994 the Government announced its decision to privatise 
Railtrack. The sale was completed in 1996 when the shares were floated on the stock 
market. 
The rolling stock was divided between three separate Rolling Stock Companies 
(ROSCOs), which were subsequently sold to the private sector in 1995-96. BR’s freight 
business was privatised and open access for freight operators was introduced. BR’s 
passenger rail operations were reorganised into 25 separate units, then transformed into 
Train Operating Companies (TOC). One or two at a time, these companies were 
subsequently franchised by means of a tendering procedure, with interested parties 
placing bids on the grounds of required subsidies. The tenders were organised by the 
newly created body Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) and the process was 
completed in late March 1997. 
Including the sales of the supporting businesses, BR was divided into more than 80 
separate companies, the intention being to create competition in as many parts of the 
sector as possible (Nash, 1997). A number of new regulations were also designed with 
the purpose to encourage competition and guard the passengers’ interests concerning 
prices and coordination of rail services. The overall responsibility for making sure that 
the different actors followed these rules was placed in the hands of the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (ORR). 
The whole reform was completed in April 1997, not long before the Parliamentary 
Election in which the Conservative Party’s 18-year reign was brought to an end. The 
winning Labour Party decided not to reverse rail privatisation (as it had promised), but 
to expand investments and strengthen the regulatory body. OPRAF was transformed 
into the new Strategic Rail Authority, established in 2001. The new authority set out to 
re-franchise the operations of the TOCs and introduce longer agreements (20 years 
instead of 7 years) in return for TOC involvement in infrastructure investment. Railtrack 
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was perceived as lacking the ability to invest enough on its own, and the new idea was 
to finance major infrastructure improvements from a variety of sources (SRA grants and 
private capital), while Railtrack would buy the assets once they had been completed 
(Nash & Smith, 2006). However, for a number of reasons, the ambitious plans did not 
materialise. The Hatfield accident in the year 2000 set off a series of events that 
eventually lead to the collapse of Railtrack, being re-placed by a non-profit company, 
Network Rail. Also, several TOC’s turned out to have problems to fulfil their 
obligations (see further below). Therefore, several franchises were re-negotiated to 
temporary cost-plus contracts in order to later be re-franchised with the old contract 
length of 7 years. Infrastructure investment did increase, but the funds were directed to 
maintain and renew the existing network rather than to perform major upgrades. 
 
Experience to date. Although the response from the private sector to TOC 
franchising was lukewarm in the beginning, the original bidding process in 1995-97 was 
very competitive, with 5-10 serious bids for each franchise. Including the limited 
number of management-buy-outs, a total of 11 separate organisations entered the UK 
passenger train industry by means of winning franchises in tenders. Companies related 
to the bus industry (such as Stagecoach, National Express and First Bus) were very 
successful. National Express won more franchises (five) than anyone else, while French 
conglomerate Connex grabbed the biggest market share (16% of ticket revenues) 
(Alexandersson et al, 1997). 
Since privatisation started, there has been a substantial concentration in terms of the 
owners behind different franchisees; National Express is now the owner of 11 TOCs. 
When re-franchised, competition has generally continued to be strong. On one occasion 
a tender was stopped prematurely since too few (only two) operators were pre-qualified. 
(Nash & Smith, 2006). It has generally been difficult for the incumbents to defend their 
franchise in tenders. 
The TOCs were to be paid annual subsidies according to net cost agreements, 
typically to be reduced over the contract period. In some cases it was even envisaged 
that the TOCs would be able to make enough profits to be able to pay back money 
towards the end of the contract period. However, in several cases, these subsidy levels 
turned out not to be sufficient and in a couple of cases the winning bidders were clearly 
too optimistic. For this reason, some franchises had to be renegotiated or re-franchised 
early, for example leading to the exit of Connex altogether in 2003 (Nash & Smith, 
2006). 
After some initial reductions in the subsidies to train operators, they are now 
considerably higher than projected – almost back to the level at the beginning – and are 
expected to rise further when track access charges are increased to account for the 
revised costs of Network Rail. Since the collapse of Railtrack, there has actually been 
nothing less than a cost explosion in the British rail industry, affecting not only 
infrastructure but also train operations and rolling stock investments (Nash & Smith, 
2006). 
In terms of demand, the British experience is much more positive. It is clear that 
passenger demand and revenue have increased substantially since privatisation, 
although it is difficult to establish the relative importance of the possible multiple 
reasons behind this development. 
 




Origin and process. Regulatory changes in the Swedish railway sector have often 
emanated from a wish to come to terms with the recurrent financial difficulties of 
Swedish State Railways (SJ). The Transport Policy Act of 1988, with its split of railway 
infrastructure from operations, is commonly considered the starting point for the 
transformation of the Swedish railway system, from a vertically and horizontally 
integrated monopoly to a market characterised by decentralisation and intra-modal 
competition. 
The Act had the objective to make the conditions for the railways more similar to 
those for the roads. The state took the full responsibility for railway infrastructure 
investments and maintenance by means of a new authority – Banverket, while SJ would 
be transformed into a train operating company, paying charges for using the tracks 
(based upon marginal costs for maintenance). The Act also marked a general policy step 
in the direction of extending the responsibility of the County Public Transport 
Authorities (CPTAs) into the unprofitable regional railway services. In return, the 
CPTAs were compensated by state subsidies equalling SJ’s operating deficits on these 
lines, and they also received the corresponding rolling stock. 
A deregulation of the railways in terms of increased intra-modal competition was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Act. Nevertheless, the vertical separation of infrastructure 
from operations, combined with the decentralised responsibility for regional railway 
services to regional authorities (along with the necessary money and rolling stock), 
made public procurement by competitive tendering of these lines possible. Some 
CPTAs had already tried tendering procedures for their bus services, as a result of 
previous reforms in that sector (Alexandersson, Hultén and Fölster, 1998). This made it 
natural to use competitive tendering also of regional railway lines. The outcome was the 
first new entrant, BK Tåg, in 1990. 
In the beginning of 1991, the Ministry of Transport expressed the view that more 
operators would stimulate the railway industry to make use of its resources in a more 
efficient way. After a shift in power in Parliament the same year, a new centre-right-
wing government declared its objective to open the railways to more competition. The 
first step was to subject more railway traffic to tendering. When SJ got rid of the 
responsibility for track infrastructure, it had been directed only to perform profitable 
train services under its own account. While large parts of the unprofitable services were 
run on the regional lines and therefore under the responsibility of the CPTAs, many 
services of the inter-regional main line network were also unprofitable. Since 1988, the 
state had been procuring these services by means of annual negotiations with SJ, but in 
1992 a competitive tendering process was used for the first time. 
In 1994, the first case of a BOT tender was completed, leading to a long-term contract 
to build and operate the new Arlanda Airport Link. The same year, a bill on a far-
reaching deregulation was passed in Parliament, but when the Social Democrats 
regained power in Parliament through the election later the same year, the deregulation 
of the railways was quickly postponed. Instead, a less radical reform was suggested, 
coming into effect in 1996. The functions of allocation of track capacity and train traffic 
control were transferred from SJ to Banverket, while other common facilities were to be 
available for other train operators under commercial but non-discriminating terms. The 
CPTAs’ rights were extended, making it easier for them to replace reductions in SJ’s 
supply of inter-regional trains with regional CPTA-managed services. Consequently, the 
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practice of competitive tendering became available for more parts of the railway 
network. For the freight services, open access on the whole network was introduced. 
A new Transport Policy Bill was passed in 1998. In an effort to achieve more equal 
terms for competing modes of transportation, in particular concerning freight, the track 
access fees were lowered. In order to make entry easier for freight operators competing 
with SJ, some fringe railway lines that had remained in SJ’s hands were transferred to 
Banverket. Moreover, a new national authority, Rikstrafiken, became responsible for 
competitive tendering of unprofitable inter-regional services (including all modes of 
public transportation). 
Following the inflow of new operators in 2000, a new Bill had the objective to 
facilitate for SJ to compete under the new circumstances and to ensure equal access to 
functions and services for all operators. SJ’s organisational structure as a business 
administration was therefore replaced in 2001 by several state-owned companies 
concentrating on specified parts of the railway businesses. The passenger division 
formed one company (SJ Ltd), the freight division another (Green Cargo), and so on for 
real estate, maintenance and other businesses. Two divisions, comprising cleaning 
services and computer information systems, respectively, were fully privatised. 
Since the Bill of 2000, it has often been suggested that the remaining monopoly of SJ 
Ltd concerning the profitable inter-regional lines should be abolished, possibly opening 
up for at least competitive tendering on these lines So far, the Social Democrat 
government has been unwilling to take this step, motivated by a perceived need for 
more time to evaluate the previous reforms, and the risk of creating new losses for SJ. 
The most recent reforms have focussed on modernising laws and regulations to achieve 
a regulatory framework in line with European Union directives and the recent railway 
packages. For example, a new Swedish Rail Agency was established in 2004. 
 
Experience to date. The past 15 years of railway reforms in Sweden have seen an 
important shift towards major investments in new and renewed infrastructure in a way 
that seemed impossible before the vertical separation of operations from rail 
infrastructure. The state has gone from spending 1 billion SEK annually on 
infrastructure investments in 1990 to about 3 billion SEK annually during the recession 
of the early 1990s, and now seems set to invest approximately 10 billion SEK (€1.1 
billion) per annum in the years to come. (All these figures are in nominal values). 
The introduction of competitive tendering of regional passenger railway lines in 1989 
immediately lead to the entry of BK Tåg in 1990. For a couple of years this remained 
the only new entrant and true competitor to SJ. It was not until 1995 that another small 
operator entered this part of the market. In the market for inter-regional services, the 
break-through for competing operators did not happen until the year 2000, after 
transparency had gradually been improved as more and more functions and resources 
had been handed over from SJ to Banverket. Currently, about 20 train operating 
companies use the Swedish state’s rail infrastructure, most of them being very small. On 
the passenger side, the state-owned company SJ Ltd is still the dominant operator, but 
private firms like Connex, Keolis and Tågkompaniet are important competitors. Arriva 
is set to enter in 2007. In terms of passenger kilometres, SJ Ltd had a 74% share of all 
railway services in 2004, with an 88% share of the long-distance (more than 100 
kilometres) and a 54% share of the short-distance (less than 100 kilometres) railway 
services. Green Cargo, formed out of the former freight division of SJ, is the largest rail 
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freight operator, with a 74% market share in rail freight transportation in 2004 
(Banverket, 2005). 
Data on subsidy reductions caused by the tenders carried out by the CPTAs is 
somewhat scarce, partly due to difficulties when comparing subsidy levels under 
different conditions. Typically, there have been subsidy reductions in the magnitude of 
20% in the first round of tendering. For the services procured by the state, substantial 
reductions were accomplished during the first two years of tendering, despite the lack of 
actual new entry. After that a period of tenders implying stable subsidies followed. 
When several new firms finally were able to win these tenders in 1999, additional large 
subsidy reductions (28%) were achieved (Alexandersson et al, 2000). 
The decentralised responsibility of regional passenger rail lines, making them 
organised by the same authorities as are responsible for public bus services, appears to 
have brought about better co-ordination of regional train services with bus services. 
Combined with the high level of ambition among many CPTAs to develop the regional 
train services, this has probably played an important role in the positive development of 
railway travel. Passenger train transportation has since 1995 experienced a stronger 
growth than all other modes in terms of passenger kilometres. Behind this increase of 
32%, we find that the growth in short-distance regional transportation has been 
particularly strong (up more than 70%), while long-distance travelling (more than 100 
km) increased by 15% (SIKA, 2005). 
In conjunction with the corporatisation of SJ and the creation of the separate 
maintenance company Euromaint, it became evident that maintenance and security 
check-ups of had been lagging behind in the integrated firm. The new organisation with 
separate entities facilitated a rapid solution to these safety issues before any fatal 
accident had occurred. 
The number of bidders taking part in Swedish passenger rail tenders has been rather 
low. On average, the CPTAs’ tenders for gross cost contracts – in which the operator 
bears no ticket revenue risk – have attracted more bidders (2-3) than the state’s tenders 
for net cost contracts (1-2) – where the operator gets the revenues from fares. A 
recurrent problem has also been the non-fulfilment of tendered contracts. In all these 
cases the railway passengers have been put at a disadvantage by disruption of the 
services, fewer trains or trains being replaced by buses.  
 Contract costs show signs of being on the increase. Both big and small firms have 
placed unreasonably low bids that have resulted in economic problems for the firms. 
Citypendeln (Keolis) had enormous problems in early 2000 when taking over the 
commuter services in Stockholm from SJ. In early 2005, Connex aborted some train 
departures of its railway services to northern Sweden after re-negotiations with 
Rikstrafiken. Loss-creating contracts have ultimately lead to bankruptcies on two 
occasions in Sweden – Sydvästen in the year 2000 and BK Tåg in 2005. After having 
placed several too optimistic bids SJ Ltd came close to bankruptcy in 2002-2003, and 
was saved mainly because the state stepped in with an additional capital of €200 
million. Litigation is also increasingly being used. In the year 2000, SJ was sentenced to 
a fine and paid substantial damages to BK Tåg after losing a court case on under-pricing 
fought against the Swedish Competition Authority. In 2002 Tågkompaniet 
unsuccessfully tried to stop Connex from taking over the trains to northern Sweden. 
Rikstrafiken was drawn into a potentially costly law-suit that it avoided by admitting to 
have made errors in the procurement of the services. In 2006 many different firms 
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Origin and process. Beginning in the 1960’s, rising deficits lead to several attempts 
to reform the German railway sector. Most of these attempts failed, due to opposing 
interest groups such as the states and the employees, and the lack of a broad political 
consensus on suggested reforms. The deficits of the national railway operator in 
Western Germany, Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB), increasingly became a major fiscal 
burden for the federal budget, reaching a record level of about €7.5 billion in 1990. 
From 1960 to 1990, the rail’s market share compared to road transportation also 
declined from 37.3% to 20.6%. When the re-unification of Germany in 1990 also added 
the problems of Deutche Reichbahn (DR), it became clear that fundamental reforms 
were absolutely necessary in the German railway sector (Kirchner, 2005). 
Three consecutive Commissions (of 1989, 1990 and 1991) suggested the 
restructuring, liberalisation and deregulation of the German railway sector, although 
differing in their view on how far liberalisation and deregulation should go (Lehmann, 
1999). The Government Commission of 1991 proposed a far-reaching structural reform 
by means of the creation of a new holding company that initially would be owned by the 
federal government but later on privatised (limited to the freight traffic and passenger 
divisions only). The debts should be transferred to an external institution, and in order to 
reduce the burden of the many privileged civil servants of the workforce, an external 
institution would take over the staff. The new holding company would then be able to 
renegotiate terms and re-hire each employee individually, paying market salaries rather 
than civil servants’ salaries. The services on the unprofitable lines were to be made the 
responsibility of the states (in a step towards regionalisation), albeit following 
negotiations on necessary subsidies taken from the federal budget. In order to stimulate 
intra-modal competition, the Commission also proposed non-discriminatory open access 
for other operators to the entire network of the new holding company (Kirchner, 2005). 
The suggested reforms were put forward as national solutions to national problems, 
but were also influenced by the current work on the European Community level which 
led to the Council Directive 91/440/EEC. 
In 1993, the two national operators DB and DR were merged into BEV, forming a 
special federal government railway asset. Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG) was then spun 
off from BEV’s assets, forming a new private stock corporation in January 1994, with 
subsidiaries for long-distance passenger services, regional passenger services, freight 
services, railway services and the track network. Cross-subsidisation between these 
entities was prohibited. DB AG was supposed to operate on commercial terms with full 
responsibility for costs and revenues, and the separation into different units was 
supposed to improve transparency and enable the units to work as profit-centres close to 
the market (Lehmann, 1999). The separation of long-distance from regional passenger 
services was linked to the regionalisation (see below) and a fear among the states that 
DB AG would otherwise cross-subsidise the long-distance services at the expense of 
regional services. 
DB AG was kept under federal government ownership, but changes in the constitution 
were made to make it possible to sell stocks to the public later on, with the exception of 
such railway undertakings that functioned as infrastructure managers. 
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Open access on non-discriminatory terms was introduced for all German railway 
companies and also for EU member states companies. A new federal regulatory body 
was set up. BEV relieved the former national operators of debts and other financial 
burdens, amounting to a massive €63 billion (Kirchner, 2005). 
Another important element of the reforms was the regionalisation of regional 
passenger services. In 1996, the German states (Länder) became responsible for the 
regional passenger services, receiving subsidies from the federal government to keep 
socially important public train services. Some states have chosen to put these services 
out to tendering, while others have chosen only to close contracts with DB Regio (a 
subsidiary to Deutsche Bahn AG) (Kirchner, 2005). 
In 1999, the reform process took another step, transforming the five operative 
divisions of Deutsche Bahn AG (now a holding company) into independent 
corporations. One of these is DB Netz, the track infrastructure provider. This model of 
“less than complete” vertical separation of infrastructure from operations has been the 
subject of much debate and criticism, since some politicians and researchers have 
claimed that it is not sufficient to exclude discrimination of other operators (despite 
additional measures such as a regulatory body and specific regulations). Others have 
defended the model as a way to keep some of the benefits of integration, such as lower 
transaction costs and possibilities for track-wheel innovations (Lehmann, 1999; 
Kirchner, 2005). 
 
Experience to date. Initial regional tenders performed by the states attracted only a 
few bidders. Rather commonly, local publicly-owned organisations or DB Regio won 
the tenders. For several years no new company entered the long-distance passenger 
market, despite the open access (Lehmann, 1999).  
In recent years, the number of new entrants has increased. A total of 286 railway 
companies are now present, most of them operating in the freight sector. Although it is 
growing, the combined market share of the new operators is still low: about 5% in rail 
passenger transportation and about 7% in freight transportation (Kirchner, 2005). In 
particular, French firms (such as Connex, Transdev and Keolis) are very active in 
Germany (Deutsche Bahn, 2004). In 2004, British Arriva entered in a major way by 
means of several acquisitions (Deutsche Bahn, 2005). 
Between 2001 and 2004, a total of 39 tenders were carried out, with contract lengths 
from 3-15 years (Brenck et al, 2005). Although contracts are commonly used in local 
and regional passenger services, they are not always awarded through tendering, and 
there are still some obstacles related to access pricing, rolling stock approval, 
administration and information (Kirchner, 2005). The practice of direct awards in some 
areas, rather than tendering, is being challenged on the EU level. There have been cases 
of very low bids in regional tenders, and also too optimistic efforts to start new long-
distance passenger services, leading to the exit of some firms (Deutsche Bahn, 2004, 
2005). 
Passenger rail services have increased their market shares between 1993 and 2003 
compared to other modes, while the share of freight services by rail has decreased 
during the same period (although it has been rising in recent years) (Kirchner, 2005). 
There is some research indicating that competitively procured lines grow faster (in 
terms of frequency) than other lines (Lalive and Schmutzler, 2005).  
The heavy investments needed in Eastern Germany have had a large impact on public 
spending on infrastructure and rolling stock. Consequently, the federal expenditures 
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since the beginning of the reform process have been very large, but nevertheless lower 
than expected, and substantially lower than what was to be expected if no reforms had 





Origin and process. The railway reform process in the Netherlands was initiated in 
1991 by means of the recommendations of a committee appointed by the Ministry of 
Transport, stating the need to make the national railway company Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS) independent of subsidies. The first actual reforms were implemented 
in 1995 with the reorganisation of NS into several subsidiaries and subdivisions. The 
subsidiary NS Groep included those divisions that were supposed to work under market 
principles (including passenger services, stations, and real estate) and was supposed to 
become privatised in the future. Infrastructure and related issues were to be handled by 
three task organisations within NS, although directly financed by the Ministry. The 
reforms of 1995 included an agreement to set the infrastructure access charges to zero 
until the year 2000, in return for a reduction in state subsidies from €130 million in 
1995 to zero in 2000 for a defined network that was supposed to be able to cover its 
operational costs (excluding infrastructure costs). A special contract agreement on 
continuous subsidies was reached for a set of other loss-making lines with socially 
desirable services (van de Velde, 2005a). 
The original committee had not proposed the introduction of competition in passenger 
services. Nevertheless, the reforms of 1995 made competition a possible option. An 
experiment with on-the-track competition came into effect after a private company had 
asked for permission to add services on some lines already operated by NS. The 
initiative lasted from 1996 to 1999 (when the new entrant went bankrupt). During this 
period, the Government also actively sought information and experiences from the 
introduction of railway competition in other countries.  
In 1999, a new administration issued a policy document that broke both with the on-
the-track experiment and a British franchising model for the national network as had 
been suggested by the former liberal administration. Instead, it suggested that NS should 
be given a 10-year concession to run the profitable part of the national network in 
accordance with a performance contract, including a number of obligations, incentives 
and targets. On the other hand, loss making regional services would increasingly be 
subjected to competitive tendering. While the new performance contract became 
delayed several years due to political opposition and NS’ problems to fulfil the targets 
in a transitional contract, a new transport law came into effect in 2000. It introduced the 
principle of “authority initiative” rather than “market initiative”. Under this principle, 
competitive tendering was to be used in all public transportation, mainly affecting the 
regional bus and train services. New regional transport authorities were created, and 
some tenders of regional lines were performed, but more commonly the threat of 
tendering was used in order to stimulate the creation of integrated bus and rail networks. 
A special government approach was used in 2001 for the new high-speed line 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Brussels, with a tender for a concession to run the services for 
15 years, while the construction and maintenance of the infrastructure was in part 
organised as a Public-Private Partnership with a contract length of 30 years (van de 
Velde, 2005a). 
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In 2002 a full separation of infrastructure management from operations was 
implemented and a new state-owned rail infrastructure organisation, ProRail, was 
created in 2003. A new monitoring and regulatory body, Office of Transport 
Regulation, was established in 2004 as a part of the National Competition Authority. 
In 2004, the 10-year concession and performance contract for the trunk rail network 
was finally settled, coming into effect in 2005. NS was granted this exclusive 
concession, which includes a number of performance clauses on gradual improvements 
but no payment from the state to NS. An evaluation in 2008 may result in a competitive 
tender, but NS is no longer set to be privatised. This concession was only one part of a 
new long-term regime for the railways, aiming at achieving a reliable railway system. 
Another 10-year concession was granted to ProRail for the management of 
infrastructure. Also, several measures were taken to improve cooperation and 
coordination between infrastructure management and the train operators. 
In December 2005, the central government decided that the process of 
decentralisation and competitive tendering of regional lines will continue, in order to 
include more lines (van Dijk, 2006). 
 
Experience to date. The introduction of contract agreements and (threats of) 
competitive tendering generally seems to have put a pressure on NS to keep costs down, 
thereby making reduced subsidies possible. For example, the initial contract for the non-
profitable lines reduced subsidies by 50%. However, NS has had a hard time reaching 
the envisioned targets and it seems as if excessive focus on rationalisations lead to a low 
reliability of both infrastructure and vehicles. Political uncertainty on how to proceed 
with reforms (regarding e.g. competition and privatisation), lack of governmental 
supervision of the task organisations, and too much focus on new infrastructure 
investment projects rather than infrastructure maintenance, created an unstable 
environment for the railways. This may have contributed to the reduced performance 
and a related drop in patronage after 2000 back to 1995 levels (van de Velde, 2005a). 
Competitive tendering has gradually been tried by more and more regional authorities, 
but has so far only affected about 6% of the Dutch network (van Dijk, 2006). Partly 
depending upon the conditions in the tenders, the resulting contracts have implied either 
a gain in quality, quantity or rolling stock, or substantially lower subsidies (20-50%) for 
the same level of supply. This may be compared to some directly awarded contracts that 
have only implied gains up to 10%. Contract periods have varied from 5-6 years to 10-
15 years (the latter involving investments in new rolling stock). 
A couple of new entrants have appeared. Apart from the case of Lovers Rail entering 
in on-the-track competition with NS, entry has occurred through the competitive 
tendering of regional lines, with companies like Arriva and Connexxion taking the lead 
(van Dijk, 2006). In addition to this, the demand for coordinated bus and railway 
services has initiated the creation of some new constellations of firms of different 
origin, such as NS and Arriva and NS and Keolis. The brief history of Lovers Rail 
showed that even if the new operator did not actually enter into some parts of the 
network that it had been granted permission to, the mere threat made NS expand and 
improve its services in these areas. The bankruptcy of Lovers Rail was ultimately 
caused by a lack of integrated ticketing with NS (van de Velde, 2005a). 
The punctuality problem in the early 2000’s caused something of a crisis in the 
Netherlands. When NS failed to meet the contracted performance target of 88%, the 
Ministry in mid 2001 initially reduced the required level to 80%. Later the same year, 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 6-28 
 24
when it became clear that NS would only reach 79.9%, the complete Board and two 





The regulatory reforms of the railway sector in the EU member states have been 
driven by different types of economic, institutional and legal concerns. We will start this 
section by examining these differences in more detail. 
In Great Britain, the pursuit of a conservative market liberalisation agenda was an 
important initiator, although the problems of British Rail also played a role. In the 
design of the reforms, two theoretical approaches seem to have dominated. First and 
foremost, the belief that private ownership and management is superior to public 
ownership, since private firms will make sure that the needs of the market will be met in 
order to reach maximum profits. For example, this explains why even the track 
infrastructure was privatised. Second, the belief that transaction costs were generally 
low, clearly lead to a very large degree of both vertical and horizontal disintegration. It 
also influenced the limits put on TOC mergers, as it was apparently believed that 
keeping the number of competitors high would benefit the market more than any 
possible gains from re-integrated services (although TOC ownership was much less 
restricted). 
In Sweden, the primary driver for reforms has been the recurrent problems to make SJ 
profitable. This has generated reforms for several decades. Since SJ’s problems have 
often been viewed as linked to heavy competition from other modes of transportation, 
several reforms have been designed to improve the possibilities for railways to meet 
inter-modal competition. This was one of the most important aims with the vertical 
separation of infrastructure from operations in 1988, making the conditions more similar 
to those for the roads. The importance of keeping unprofitable lines running for social 
concerns has been another important factor. Coupled with the idea to decentralise the 
responsibility to the level where this mattered most (the regional level) this became the 
starting point for the introduction of contracts and tendering in the Swedish railway 
sector. It was not foreseen that this would lead to intra-modal competition, but once it 
did with positive results, it became a part of the political agenda and competitive 
tendering spread to more and more railway lines. The process of reforms in Sweden has 
been incremental compared to the more radical approach of Great Britain. A more 
radical approach was tried once (in 1994) but was reversed by a new political majority 
even before it was implemented. Although some actors have advocated more general 
steps towards deregulation and privatisation, the impact upon overall railway 
transportation policy has been rather limited. One exception is the deregulation of 
freight services in 1996. The only instant when private sector capital has actively been 
sought after was in the BOT tender of the new Arlanda airport link. 
In Germany, reforms were clearly borne out of necessity, following many years of 
financial problems and deteriorated market shares, culminating at the time of the 
German re-unification in 1990. The reforms focussed upon relieving the railways of 
debts and costly rules of employment to make a fresh start, initially with the intention of 
a future privatisation of passenger and freight operations. Regionalisation opened up for 
competitive tendering of local lines and networks, but several regions have chosen not 
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to make use of tendering. Overall, there has not been a general policy to promote 
efficiency by means of intra-modal competition, although the introduction of open 
access for long-distance passenger services was a step in that direction. To make the 
railways more efficient to meet inter-modal competition seems to have been more 
important. Also, Germany has been very reluctant to go all the way in terms of vertical 
separation of infrastructure from operations, based upon a firm belief in the benefits of 
integration. 
The Netherlands has spent several years seeking for appropriate reforms to 
implement, that to a considerable extent draw on the experiences of other countries. The 
policy has varied over time depending upon circumstances, also making room for 
experiments with on-the-track competition. Initially, the growing subsidies played an 
important role as initiator to the reforms, and privatisation of NS operations was 
envisaged as preferable and possible. Regionalisation has been carried out, while the 
approach to competitive tendering at first was ambivalent but now looks set to continue. 
A common principle has been to use the threat of competitive tendering as a way to 
promote performance improvement. Railway performance, seen from the end user 
perspective, has been very important (more so than financial concerns). Much effort has 
been put into the creation of contracts focussing on performance measures and targets. 
Recurrent failures to meet performance have also created situations of crisis. 
Privatisation of NS passenger operations is no longer seen as an option – following the 
mixed British experience and experiences from other sectors. 
The parallel development of a common European Union policy for the railways has 
played a role in the reform process of individual member states, but the extent and 
impact vary among countries. The vertical separation in Sweden preceded the EU 
initiative (Sweden did not join the EU until seven years after this reform). It may 
actually be argued that EU policy to some extent was influenced by Sweden’s reforms. 
During the second half of the 1990’s, Sweden was mostly prompted to implement minor 
revisions in the regulatory framework in order to comply with EU policy. In recent 
years, the influence has become bigger and the impact will most certainly be 
pronounced if the liberalisation of international passenger services actually happens in 
2010. In Great Britain, EU policy may not have played a role as an initiator, but 
possibly influenced the design (vertical separation). The radical reforms of Great 
Britain, and their effects, have been a source of inspiration in most European Union 
member states, but sometimes also used as warning examples in order to oppose 
reforms where privatisation would be an important element. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, EU policy has played a role for the timing of reforms, but both countries 
have sought to find national solutions that avoided a full separation of infrastructure 
from operations. In the Netherlands, this is no longer the case, while Germany has 
persisted in keeping some vertical integration. 
It is evident that the different tendering regimes suffer from different types of 
problems. In the Swedish tenders there have often been very few competing firms. In 
Britain the relatively long time span of the first round of franchised contracts resulted in 
difficulties in making correct estimates of the future behaviour of the markets and 
market actors. In Germany, tenders are mostly used in the local and regional markets 
and they have not significantly helped to diminish the deficits in the railway sector. The 
Netherlands has recently started with competitive tenders and their effects are so far 
rather limited, but problems related to NS performance have been exposed. Sweden, 
Germany and Great Britain have all experienced problems with winning bids that turned 
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The introduction of competitive tendering has been theoretically motivated by a 
general belief that the private sector is more effective than the public sector and that 
competition fosters efficiency. Advocates of PPP solutions typically state that long-term 
private sector involvement like BOT arrangements offer more advantages than e.g. 
short-term service or management contracts. Their basic argument is that the bundling 
of activities in a BOT enables a private firm or consortium to optimise the total project. 
This is not really reflected in the policies and actions of the European Union member 
states and public authorities. In the case of passenger railway services, it is evident that 
they have been more interested in using competition either as a threat or as a mean to 
increase efficiency in the railway market. The number of BOT projects is very limited. 
Before the reforms and deregulation of the European railway services took off, there 
was a widespread belief in important economies of scale in railway operations. After 
more than fifteen years of competitive tendering, we can note that more and more public 
agencies purchasing railway passenger services act as if the gains from competition are 
greater than any potential resulting losses of economies of scale, scope or density. There 
may be multiple reasons for this, such as agency costs and problems for the political 
system to supervise the activities of a monopoly, but also a belief that competition 
between several firms will still allow for economies of scale to be exploited where 
appropriate. 
A possible increase in transaction costs has not been seen as a major obstacle for the 
introduction of competitive tendering or the vertical separation of the former national 
railway monopolies. Generally speaking, there has been a clear trend towards the use of 
more and more contracts to formalise the obligations of different actors in the European 
railway industry. However, recent research suggests that transaction costs may be 
higher than expected. The evidence is both theoretical and empirical. Asset specificity 
may have produced problems when designing the contracts in the British case. A lack of 
bidders (the small numbers problem) has been apparent in some countries. Contract 
costs seem to be inherent in the competitive tenders, in auctions as well as beauty 
contests. Many winning bids have been too optimistic, the combined evaluation of price 
and quality has often resulted in legal processes, and renegotiations have turned out to 
be necessary when costs and revenues didn’t develop according to plans. 
We see at least two major possibilities for future empirical research. Firstly, a 
comparative European study directed towards measuring the effects of competitive 
tendering and testing the relative contribution of different factors, such as network size, 
number of bidders, contract length, how many times the services have been tendered, 
type of contract (net or gross cost), upstream competitive markets or vertical monopoly, 
and so on. Secondly, research projects including both statistical and qualitative data, 
comparing railway systems using competitive tendering to railway systems using either 
negotiated contracts or a monopoly regime. Such a study could shed some light on the 
relative merits of the different regimes after nearly two decades of experimentation with 
railway deregulation in Europe. 
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Competitive tendering of local public transport services has been allowed in Norway since 1994. By 
2005, 28 percent of all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, 
covering around 40 percent of all passengers. The majority of the tendered contracts were gross cost 
contracts, whereas historically, most Norwegian contracts have been net cost contracts. This article 
analyses the effect of competitive tendering on operating cost and subsidies paid. It is found that 
competitive tendering reduces costs by 10 percent and that most of the cost reduction has been used to 
reduce subsidies for public transport by local authorities. The effects of competitive tendering in Norway 
are smaller compared to other countries. This can be attributed to the fact that the industry had improved 
efficiency over a long period before competitive tendering was introduced. 
 





Competitive tendering is now a well-established practice for procurement of public 
transport (PT) services in several European countries, and is continuously spreading to 
further areas. Its popularity is partly related to its success to deliver cost-efficient 
production, even though later developments cast doubts on whether these efficiency 
gains are sustainable in the longer run. Moreover, the efficiency gains provided through 
the first-time tendering process seem highly dependent on variations in previous 
contractual arrangements and whether or not there has been a public, in-house 
production unit. Explanations of efficiency gains from competitive tendering in 
different areas must take into account the context in which the tendering process has 
taken place. In that respect, the level of efficiency before tendering is introduced to a 
large extent limits the potential gain from actually introducing tendering.  
This article examines the effects of competitive tendering in Norway on cost and 
subsidy levels. In Norway, local public transport lies under the jurisdiction of 19 county 
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councils. Until 1986, a part of the framework-funding scheme for local authorities was 
earmarked for PT services. In 1986, such earmarking was removed, allowing local 
authorities to freely prioritise between PT and other services under their jurisdiction. 
This created a strong focus on the costs of PT operation.  
PT service production has traditionally been procured through negotiated net cost 
contracts with private or semi-private (publicly owned) operators. Public in-house 
production has been limited to the major cities. Due to this, a majority of the Norwegian 
bus industry has been fully or partly on private hands, to a large extent combined with 
the market initiative of net-cost agreements. This implies that there was a great deal of 
private interests in the bus industry even prior to the 1994-directive, which permitted the 
use of tendering by law. The 1994-directive, together with reduced state funds for 
transport and communication purposes within the framework-funding scheme, brought 
about a rising use of competitive tendering during the late 1990s. In 2005, 28 percent of 
all route production in Norway was procured on the basis of tendered contracts, 
covering around 40 percent of all passengers. Nevertheless, negotiated contracts still 
constitute the majority of all local bus contracts in Norway. 
The main question this article sets out to answer is; what are the cost savings of 
competitive tendering for Norwegian procuring authorities? The analysis is based on an 
recent evaluation of competitive tendering in Norwegian local bus transport, where 
analysis of quantitative data over a 15 year period are combined with a qualitative 
assessment of different contractual arrangements both for tendered services and for 
services not tendered as a control group (Bekken et al 2006). The analysis presented in 
this article is primarily based on the quantitative data set, even though the results are 
interpreted by using the qualitatively obtained information. 
 
Background and hypothesis 
 
Competitive tendering refers to a situation where the state allows other legal entities 
to compete for the right to carry out a task that the state traditionally has carried out 
itself or purchased directly by means of negotiated contracts (Longva et al 2005). 
Hence, competitive tendering differs significantly from free competition and does not 
necessarily imply privatisation of the businesses. Both Denmark (Copenhagen) and 
Sweden were quick off the mark with competitive tendering for local bus services and 
created the basis for what is often referred to as the Scandinavian model in such 
contexts (van de Velde 2005 and 2004). This means that the authorities are responsible 
for drawing up the public transport service, which is then purchased from private/public 
legal companies through a tendering process. Even though Norwegian authorities show 
a growing interest in implementing incentive contracts within the tendering regime, the 
“Scandinavian model” is still the dominant form in Norway as well (Longva et al 2005).  
Evidence from the Scandinavian countries supports the general view that competitive 
tendering is associated with cost savings for the procuring body, at least on a short-term 
basis. In Sweden, competitive tendering was introduced in 1989. Previously, most 
service production was run by public companies, either on the basis of in-house 
production or procured through negotiated gross cost contracts. However, in 2001 95 
percent of services had been subject to competitive tendering at least once, and now 
private operators dominated the market (Alexandersson and Pyddoke 2003). National 
data for the period 1987-1993 indicated unit cost reductions due to competitive 
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tendering of around 13 percent, later re-estimated to an isolated effect of 6-7 percent 
(Alexandersson et al 1998). Figures from Stockholm and Helsingborg indicate even 
greater unit cost reductions on a short-time basis, in the range of 20-30 percent (Nilsson 
et al 2005, Nilsson et al 2003, Jansson 2002 and Reiter 2002).  
In the longer run, however, the efficiency gains seem to have halted in Sweden. 
Recent data show little further reduction in unit costs since the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
data from larger urban areas even indicate rising cost levels in the third and fourth round 
of tendering (Nilsson et al 2005, Jansson 2002). The costs are nevertheless still below 
their initial levels, even though they encompass much higher service standards. 
Alexandersson and Pyddoke (2003) largely confirm this picture on a nationwide basis. 
They have updated the data set initially presented in Alexandersson et al (1998). The 
period of rising share of tendered services (1989 to 2001) coincides with steadily falling 
cost levels, at least until 1999. In the years 2000 and 2001 costs were increasing, but 
still way below the level of 1989. Consequently, the isolated cost saving effect of 
tendering is a bit smaller than in their initial study, but still significant.   
In Denmark a 1990-legislation imposed a requirement for competitive tendering on all 
bus services, which was gradually implemented in the period up to 2002. Private 
operators replaced the previous market dominance of public operators. In Copenhagen, 
unit costs were reduced by about 24 percent in the period 1990-1997 (HUR 2001). As in 
Sweden, however, later rounds of tendering have shown increasing costs, partly due to 
rising service standards. Similar developments are also found in England (ATCO, 
2004). Nevertheless, unit costs are still below the pre-tendering levels (HUR 2005).  
These Scandinavian experiences mirror Wallis and Hensher's (2005) conclusion from 
investigations of tendering-effects in urban bus services from 10 developed countries, 
covering more than 20 cities. Based on evidence from research conducted in Great 
Britain, Scandinavia, USA, Australia and New Zealand, the authors conclude that short-
run cost savings from competitive tendering vary from 5 to 50 percent. As a crude “rule 
of thumb” the authors suggest indicative cost savings of 30 percent from competitive 
tendering on a short-run basis. These cost-savings find further support in a review of 
European experiences in Longva et al (2005). They argue that such cost effects occur 
from competition irrespective of the tendering procedures and contractual clauses 
actually chosen. 
As pinpointed in the studies referred to above, numerous factors will influence the 
differences in results between the different countries and areas. One main factor seems 
to be that of the pre-competitive tendering situation, defined by historical contractual 
clauses and ownership structure. As opposed to their Scandinavian partners, previously 
dominated by public operators running on negotiated gross cost contracts, Norway has a 
tradition for granting the subsidies on a net cost basis to operators operating on long-
termed concessions given for an area or a single route, except for the capital area of 
Oslo, the operators were all private right incorporated companies, often with private 
shareholders only (Johansen 1999). This Norwegian combination of net cost contracts 
and private operators is rather unique in international terms (Johansen et al 2000). 
Consequently, the supposed effect of privatisation per se seems less prominent in 
Norway. 
Over the period 1986-96 unit costs for the Norwegian bus industry as a whole were 
estimated to have reduced at the range 6-20 percent, whilst tendering contracts still only 
attributed to around 2 percent of the service production (Johansen 1999). Much cost 
saving was in other words already achieved before competitive tendering became an 
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influential force in Norway. These cost reductions seem more attributable to the threat 
of competitive tendering and the change from an earmarked funding scheme to a more 
free funding scheme rather than the use of competitive tendering itself. It must also be 
mentioned that so-called “normalised cost contracts” with “efficiency agreements” has 
been widely used. Such contracts require the operator to improve efficiency by a certain 
percent by deducting this from the general price increase of the “normalised costs 
contracts”. Such contracts are still influential in Norway, as only 28 percent of the 
services were procured on the basis of competitive tendering in 2005 (Bekken et al 
2006). The cost reductions prior to the rising share of competitive tendering leads us to 
an expectation of lower cost saving potential in Norway than elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
some cost savings for the procuring authorities should be expected, at least when it 
comes to unit costs, partly as a result of competition itself and partly as a result of the 
move from net cost contracts to gross cost contracts.  
The procuring authorities introduced gross cost contracts at the same time as 
competitive tendering was introduced. While net cost contracts constituted 90 percent of 
all services that were procured on a negotiated basis in Norway in 2005, gross cost 
contracts constituted 96 percent of the tendered ones (Bekken et al 2006). Even though 
Norwegian authorities show growing interest in implementing financial incentives 
within the gross cost framework, the corresponding higher risks endured by the operator 
are rarely compensated with greater freedom of design (Bekken et al 2006). Hence, the 
growing use of incentive contracts does not alter the fact that competitive tendering in 
Norway has brought about a shift in market responsibility from the operator to the 
authorities, mirroring the move from a net cost to a gross cost subsidy regime. Service 
and quality levels previously approved by local authorities on the basis of the operators’ 
initiative, are now increasingly being pre-defined by the authorities as part of the 
procurement process. Costs in terms of route planning, quality assessments, market 
research and market risk are thus being transferred as well. Parts of the cost-saving 
effects from first round of tendering may therefore be attributed to transfer of costs and 
risk rather than efficiency improvements.  
To summarise, the following findings for Norway will be expected from competitive 
tendering: (i) The higher share of competitive tendering, the lower costs for the 
procuring authorities, (ii) The initial cost reductions will however be lower in Norway 
than experienced elsewhere (as in Sweden and Denmark), and (iii) The move from 
negotiated net cost contracts to gross cost tendering leads to subsidy reductions rather 
than service improvements and increased service levels. 
 
Data sources and model specifications 
 
The data used for the analyses consists of pooled time series of key indicators for 
public transport from each of the 19 Norwegian counties. The data set covers the period 
from 1986 to 2005 (forecast), although the time series are fairly complete only from 
1992 to 2005. That is from 3 years before the first tendered buss service in Norway. 
Because some of the time series are incomplete for individual data and counties, some 
ratios (like subsidy as proportion of costs) are only obtainable from a few counties in 
the last five years.  
The data set has been quality assured in two ways. First, each of the counties has had 
the opportunity to comment, explain and update their data. Second, we have checked the 
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data for large or inexplicable variations from year to year, and removed data, which are 
obviously erroneous. In some cases incorrect data have been replaced with interpolated 
values. There will inevitably still be some errors in the data set, which relate in 
particular to some of the older data. However, the database is the best available historic 
data for local public transport in Norway. Table 1 summarises key figures in the data set 
for 1991 and 2004. 
Table 1: Key figures of the data set. Monetary values in fixed 2004 NOKs (€1≈NOK8). 
 1991 2004 
 Lowest Mean Highest Lowest Mean Highest 
Proportion tendered services* 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 20 % 100 % 
Subsidy as proportion of costs** 30 % 41 % 80 % 18 % 37 % 60 % 
Cost/veh.km, NOK 14,2 20,5 42,3 16,0 19,1 23,1 
Average fare, NOK*** 8,2 13,0 16,2 10,1 14,3 18,2 
* Proportion of produced kilometres subjected to competitive tendering 
** Year 2000 data used instead of 2004  
*** One county with exceptionally high fare levels has been excluded 
 
Three econometric models are specified in order to isolate the effect of competitive 
tendering on total costs, cost per vehicle kilometre and total subsidy, respectively. OLS 
regression is used to correct for the influence of other variables that affect costs and 
subsidy levels. OLS is a sufficiently appropriate approach for the purpose of isolating 
the effects of tendering from the effects of other factors when we have pooled time 
series data. OLS estimation is a simple estimation procedure, which also provides 
simple interpretation of parameters. Further, it also facilitates comparison with the 
Swedish study of Alexandersson et al. (1998), who used OLS. The limitations of OLS 
models concern in particular the inability to estimate models that are intrinsically 
nonlinear in their parameters – an issue beyond the scope of this study – and problems 
with truncated variables. It is unlikely, however, that the choice of estimation procedure 
will affect the overall findings of the study, although it may produce different estimates 
especially of the extreme cases.  
Whereas Alexandersson et al. (1998) in a similar study specified models with 
extensive use of variables representing changes in lagged, lead and current levels of 
tendering, which neither produced many significant parameters nor readily interpretable 
estimates, we have kept the models simple, the number of explanatory variables low and 
focused on those model specifications that produce robust estimates.  
The following model specifications will be used. They are the result of several model 
runs where different specifications were tested: 
 
1. K = β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender  
2. VK =  β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender  
3. T =  β0 + β1*VKM + β2*PAX + β3*Ddiesel + β4*Tender + β5*POP 
 
Where: 
K is total cost * 
VK is cost per vehicle kilometre * 
T is subsidy paid by the County * 
VKM is vehicle kilometres produced * 
PAX is the number of passengers per year* 
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Ddiesel is a dummy for diesel duty, which was introduced in 1999 
Tender is the proportion of route production is subjected to competitive tendering 
POP is population density * 
β are the parameters to be estimated (β0 is the constant term in the equation) 
 
All monetary values are transformed to 2004 prices, using the retail price index. 
Variables marked with an asterisk (*) are log-transformed using the natural logarithm. 
Their parameter estimates are therefore readily interpretable as (constant) elasticities. 
The variable "Tender" is not log-transformed. The interpretation of the effect of 
competitive tendering is therefore that one unit (percentage point) increase in the route 
production subject to competitive tendering increases K, VK and T with a factor of β4. 
Our a priori expectations are 1) that β1 has a positive sign in model 1 and 3, i.e. 
increased route production increases cost and subsidy levels. In case of scale economies 
β1 will be negative in equation 2; 2) that β2 and β3 are positive; and 3) that β3 is 
negative, i.e. competitive tendering reduces costs and subsidies. 
An important structural difference between the counties is the degree of urbanisation. 
While some counties are largely rural, others – notably Oslo – are predominantly urban. 




Figure 1 shows the developments in operating costs and subsidies paid by county 
councils to public transport operators. The figure also indicates the timing of key events 












































Figure 1: Developments in average cost per vehicle-kilometre and subsidies. Index 1991=1.00. Fixed 
prices. 
 
Cost and subsidy levels fell in the 1990s up until about 1997/98. From 1997/98 
onwards, costs and in particular subsidy levels increased dramatically till around 2000 
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when the curves flatten off. It is evident that the developments in subsidy payments 
follow the developments in costs. However, the fluctuations in subsidy payments are 
significantly larger than the variation in costs. This is partly due to the fact that 
subsidies typically are about 30 percent of costs, making changes in subsidies related to 
changes in costs by a factor of three. 
The cost and subsidy reductions started before the Transport Act was set in force in 
1994. Several explanations can be offered. The change of financing scheme of the 
county councils from earmarked to framework funding in 1986, implied that the 
counties had to prioritise between public transport and policy areas like health and 
education. Moreover, it has been argued that the cost reductions were a result of 
operators preparing themselves for the competitive tendering regime that was to come 
(Carlquist and Fearnley, 2001). Central government transfers to county councils were 
then reduced every year from 1995 to 1999 due to the expected efficiency gains in local 
public transport that would arise from competitive tendering.  
Prior to 1999, bus services were exempted from the diesel duty. From 1999 this 
exemption was replaced by a reimbursement scheme. On average the compensation has 
been somewhere around 95% of the diesel duty. Our analyses do not exclude costs and 
subsidies that relate to this tax. It is therefore evident from figure 1 that costs and 
subsidies increased in 1999. 
In 2004, a VAT reform was set in force. This reform subjected local public transport 
in Norway to value added tax (VAT). The VAT was set at 6 percent, but with full 
deduction of input VAT at 24 percent. In reality this was therefore an indirect way of 
state subsidies to local public transport services, which was also the expressed purpose. 
 
 
Do half-way solutions result in poorer performance? 
 
As an initial attempt to identify possible effects of competitive tendering in the data 
material, we have grouped the 19 Norwegian counties according to their use, or 
determination to introduce, competitive tendering. Three categories are identified:   
1. Predominantly tendered contracts: Counties with more than 50 percent 
competitively tendered bus mileage and/or decision to increase use of competitive 
tendering (4 counties). 
2. Mixture: Less than 50 percent competitively tendered bus mileage or use of 
negotiated contracts with explicit threat of tendering or decision to introduce tendering 
(7 counties). 
3. Predominantly pre-negotiated contracts: No tendering and no intention to introduce 
competitive tender (7 counties). 
By comparing these three groups of counties we get a first impression of their relative 
performance (table 2). 
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Table 2: Change between 1991 and 2005 in counties with predominantly tendered services, a mixture of 
tendered and pre-negotiated contracts and predominantly pre-negotiated contracts, respectively. 




Trips/capita +18% -7% +18% 
Route production +4 % -17 % +13 % 
Cost/veh. km -18% +15% +1% 
Subsidy/cost +12% +26% +10% 
Average fare +8% +1% +5% 
 
This preliminary comparison clearly shows that counties, which have chosen a regime 
with a mixture of tenders and pre-negotiated contracts, have performed poorly relative 
to those, which to a greater extent have chosen one or the other. We see from table 2 
that route production has been reduced substantially despite large subsidy increases in 
the "mixture" group. Operating costs per vehicle-kilometre have also increased 
considerably in this group. The result is loss of passengers, quite opposite the 
achievements in the two other groups of counties.  
The comparison can also be interpreted in terms of market orientation. Typically, 
passengers place more emphasis on improved service levels than on fare reductions 
(Carlquist and Fearnley, 2001). While the "mixture" group has kept fare levels more or 
less unchanged at the expense of reduced service levels and higher subsidy 
requirements, the two other groups have increased fares in order to finance service 
improvements. The latter approach is therefore more market oriented, and, as opposed 
to the "mixture" group, has resulted in increased patronage. 
The threat of tendering, which should be most present in the "mixture" group, seems 
not to have had any dampening effect on costs or subsidies. Rather, this preliminary 
presentation of the data suggests a less straightforward pattern of relationship between 
competitive tendering and threat of competitive tendering on the one hand, and cost 
performance on the other. 
Obviously, our division of county types is somewhat arbitrary, and hides other 
structural differences between the groups. For example, counties in the first group have 
larger populations, more passengers and higher operating cost than the others. In the 
next section, therefore, we enhance the analytical approach by isolating the effects of 
competitive tendering from other factors that influence performance. 
 
 
Tenders have reduced costs and subsidies 
 
We have estimated models for total costs, costs per bus kilometre and subsidies, as 
described above. Competitive tendering is among the explanatory variables in each 
model. The chosen model specifications are the results of several model runs in which 
different explanatory variables have been tested. In addition to sign, size and 
significance level of parameter estimates, we have preferred simple models rather than 
models with large numbers of explanatory variables as long as the overall performance 
of the models is maintained. For example, population density was found to replace 18 
county dummies relatively well, and thus preferred. Table 3 summarises the model 
outputs. 
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Table 3: Model summaries 
Variable Total cost 
model 




Vehicle kilometre 0.90 ** -0.10 ** 0.80 ** 
Passenger number 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.10 * 
Diesel duty 7.1 % ** 6.1 % ** 26 % ** 
Population density     -0.07 ** 
Percent competitive tendering  -0.1 % * -0.1 % * -0.7 % ** 
Adj R2 = 0.94 0.94 0.50 0.62 
* Significant 10 % level 
**  Significant 5 % level 
 
The effect of competitive tendering is stable in all models. Competitive tendering 
contributes to a reduction in both costs and subsidies. Our calculations show that a 1 per 
cent increase in route production open to competition reduces costs by 0.1 per cent. In 
other words, competitive tendering reduces costs by approximately a tenth. A move 
from no competitive tendering to full competitive tendering will provide cost savings of 
approximately 10 percent.  
According to our model estimate, one percentage point increase in the use of 
competitive tendering reduces the need for subsidies by 0.7 per cent. Given the fact that 
subsidies only cover a fraction of the costs (typically a third) and that the county 
councils have good opportunities to reap the majority of the cost saving in connection 
with tenders, tenders have a greater effect on the level of subsidises than on costs. In 
addition, as we have shown in table 2 above, fare levels have increased faster in 
counties with competitive tendering, contributing to further reductions in subsidy 
requirements. 
This means both that tenders have resulted in more cost-effective production and that 
the savings have to a large extent been taken out in the form reduced subsidies rather 
than improved service levels.  
 
 
Conclusion and discussion  
 
The main aim of this article has been to analyse the effect of competitive tendering on 
operating cost and subsidies. The article has put forward two important conclusions. 
First, exposure to competition has up to now contributed to cost effectiveness, which in 
turn has made it possible to reduce subsidies. At the same time, reduced subsidies have 
also been a driving force behind the use of competitive tendering. Second, counties that 
have chosen a regime with a mixture of tenders and negotiated contracts appear to have 
experienced a less favourable development than those that to a larger extent have 
chosen one over the other. 
 
 
Tenders have reduced costs and subsidies, but less than in other countries 
 
As mentioned, we have found that tenders contribute to a reduction in both costs and 
subsidies. Our calculations show that competitive tendering reduces operating costs by 
10 percent. A 1 per cent increase in production open to competition reduces the need for 
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subsidies by 0.7 per cent. In other words, tenders have resulted in more cost effective 
production, and the savings have been taken out in the form of reduced subsidies, rather 
than enhanced level of service. 
Compared with international experiences, the cost saving effect from competitive 
tendering in Norway is on the lower scale. This is not to say that competitive tendering 
has been less successful in Norway compared to other places. The result is due to the 
fact that the industry had improved the effectiveness substantially already before 
competitive tendering was introduced. Thus, one should consider the context in depth 
before jumping to conclusions on the success of competitive tendering. 
There are, however, also reasons to cast a critical glance at our a priori hypothesis of 
massive cost transfers occurring as a consequence of the shift from net cost to gross cost 
contracts. A closer examination of previous net cost contracts reveals that actual 
passenger incentives and income risks are smaller than initially assumed. As shown in 
Bekken et al (2006) the negotiated net cost contracts in Norway often encompass 
clauses that allow for renegotiation of the contract if the passenger revenue is 
significantly higher or lower than the revenue from the previous year. Moreover, the 
subsidy level is negotiated on a year-to-year basis, putting even further limits to the 
effect on passenger incentives inherent in the net cost contracts. When the new tender 
contracts are increasingly supplemented with patronage incentives and associated risks, 
while being of a significantly longer duration, the differences in the actual income, risk 
and investment structures – and thus the transfer of costs from the operator to the 
authority – become less. This is further strengthened by the fact that increasing use of 
incentive contracting in Norway is rarely accompanied with increasing room for design 
manoeuvring for the operator, restricting his options when it comes to risk 
diversification.  
At the same time, effects and challenges experienced by the counties in the transition 
from a direct purchase regime to competitive tendering will vary from one county to 
another - from one context to another. This is partly due to the fact that the forms of 
competition and contracts which are introduced under the new regime will vary between 
counties according to the degree of exposure to competition and also because the form 
of the contracts which they are giving up will vary from county to county. Altogether, 
this calls for further nuances when it comes to how large (or small) effects can be 
expected from the introduction of tenders in each individual county. In many ways, the 
national level appears to be too broad.  
 
 
Does tendering have any adverse effects? 
 
One of our main findings were that counties that have chosen a regime with a mixture 
of tenders and negotiated contracts appear to have experienced a less favourable 
development than counties that to a larger extent have chosen one over the other. One 
explanation for this striking difference in performance can be related to the fact that the 
introduction of competitive tendering reduces the reliability of dialogue in pre-
negotiated contracts, so that the operators adapt to a competitive situation even though 
their contract is not immediately exposed to competition. Additionally, it is the case that 
areas with the greatest potential for cost reductions are first put out to tender.  
The threat of competitive tenders may thus have two rather opposite effects, 
depending on the context in which they are implemented. On the one hand, the threat 
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creates pressures to make the business more efficient. This was clearly apparent in 
Norway through the effectiveness agreements prior to competitive tendering. On the 
other hand, however, threats of tendering may weaken the long-lasting trust relationship 
between one particular operator and the purchaser. This is of particular importance in 
those cases where previous production was sustained by so-called high-trust 
relationships and incomplete contracts (Longva and Osland 2005). The introduction of 
competitive tendering in one part of the county may thus create unclear operator-
purchaser relationships in the remaining parts that still rely on negotiated net cost 
contracts with heavy risk bearing and market responsibility for the operator. The mere 
existence of a threat of tendering will inevitably make the prolongation of the contract 
less likely, leading the operator to keep more in terms with the actual length of the 
contract as described by its formal clauses. Consequently, the operator’s horizon of 
investments will be shortened, and with annual negotiations this results in a very 
shortsighted focus on costs, and discourages long-term investments and other long-term 
commitments.  
All of this suggests that there is a danger inherent in the threat of competition which 
over time can make the threat less useful when it comes to cost reduction. New 
contractual clauses and role diversification are therefore necessary in the none-tendered 
parts of the county as well, making them more in line with their new relational context, 
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Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major 
objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal framework some competitive tendering 
was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the 
incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases 
negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, 
other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings. 
 






In the last century many local bus companies in Italy (as in many European countries) 
enjoyed monopoly protection by means of non-tendered concessions or public 
ownership. The financial performance of these firms has deteriorated for more than 
thirty years. Financial distress is only partly explained by declining patronage (lower 
shares in the private – public transport split) and fares permanently lower than average 
costs. An important role is also played by low and stagnant productivity, due to weak 
incentives for efficiency. Weak incentives, in turn, are not surprisingly related to cost-
plus contracts, based on individual negotiations between local governments and the 
(local) monopoly firm. Incentives are even weaker when the firm is publicly owned and 
the local government can not credibly commit to let the firm go bankrupt in the 
presence of high and/or increasing deficits (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
Competitive tendering is held to be the most effective instrument to create 
competitive pressure in a market in which an open competition among firms is not 
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feasible or uneconomic (Demsetz, 1968). In Europe competitive tendering of transport 
services has been implemented in France, in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian 
countries. As summarised by Hensher and Wallis (2005), in fifteen years competitive 
tendering brought about a 50-55% reduction in real unit costs in London, whilst in 
Scandinavia there were savings ranging from 5 to 34%, but most in the range of 20-
30%1. 
The appraisal of the French experience casts some doubts on the efficiency enhancing 
properties of competitive tendering. It has been said that “competition has not been 
fostered and the performance indicators are still mediocre, not to mention the fact that 
collusion still exists” (Yvrande-Billon, 2005, p. 19). The French Competition 
Commission, in 2005 denounced the existence of a cartel between the three leading 
operators, who were alleged for explicit bidding coordination, leading to higher prices 
“than those that would have resulted from a competitive functioning of the market” 
(Yvrande-Billon, 2005, p. 15). 
In order to improve the allocative and productive efficiency of the local bus industry, 
the Italian government introduced a reform (D.lgs. 422/97 and 400/99) whose main 
purpose was to create a more market-oriented industry, enhance competition and reduce 
the huge amount of subsidies to the unprofitable local bus companies. In particular, the 
bill stated that non-tendered concessions were to be banned as of January 2004. By that 
date all subsidised local transport services (rail services included) would have been 
tendered off. Later legislative interventions changed the institutional framework, 
introducing normative uncertainty and leaving discretion to local governments whether 
tendering out concessions or making use of in house provision. Despite all these 
fluctuations in the legal rules, in some regions tenders did actually take place.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the competitive tendering procedures in Italy 
and to point out the main difficulties that have so far hindered the process. The structure 
of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the most important issues that competitive 
tendering in the local bus industry rises are briefly examined. In section 3 a summary of 
the results of competitive tendering is presented - making use of the information we 
gathered and organised over the years – followed by a tentative assessment of those 
results. Section 4 concludes that, if some “political” conditions favouring more effective 
tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to 
obtain substantial subsidy savings.  
 
 
2. Relevant issues for competitive tendering  
 
As suggested by the recent economic literature (Klemperer, 2004), an efficient 
outcome of an award procedure depends on several factors, in particular on the number 
of participants, on the absence of barriers to entry and on the existence of widespread 
knowledge about the best production technologies. The implementation of a competitive 
tendering process in the bus industry is even more complex, as not only economic but 
also technical aspects of the services must be taken into account2. First, the local 
                                                 
1 See also Alexandersson, Folster, Hultén (1998); Kennedy (1998); Ramella (2001); Toner (2001); 
London Transport (2002); Alexandersson, Pyddoke (2003); Boitani, Cambini (2004a). 
2 Notice that, since local transport services are unprofitable at the present Italian level of fares and costs, 
the price that comes out of a competitive tendering normally consists of the remuneration that the winning 
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authority has to define the type of contract to be offered to the winning bidders. 
Following the analysis of Isotope (1997), there are two different types of on-going risks 
that a supplier of transport services has to face: the production risk, associated with the 
production cost of the services’ provision; and the revenue (or commercial) risk, 
associated with the sale of transport services. The allocation of these risks defines a set 
of different types of contracts that could be tendered: 
• Gross Cost Contract: the transport firm bears only the production risk while the 
revenue risk is born by the tendering authority. The firm receives a unit transfer related 
to an anticipated unit cost. Revenues accrue only to the tendering authority. 
• Net Cost Contract: both risks are born by the transport firm. It receives a transfer 
determined in the tendering process, equal to the difference between anticipated total 
costs and traffic revenues. 
There is a variety of incentive contracts between local authorities and the transport 
firm - such as gross cost contracts with revenue incentive, or net cost contracts with 
shared revenue risk - in which the revenue risk is split between actors. Different types of 
contract entail different incentives to minimize costs and/or to control revenues. 
Whatever type of contract has to be clearly specified ex ante when designing the 
tendering procedure. 
The size of the service-area is the second element that local governments should 
define in a tendering procedure. Ex ante costs and benefits of different alternatives are 
as follows (Cambini, Filippini, 2003): 
• Route-by-route tendering guarantees an efficient production of transport services, as 
the number of potential bidders can be expected to be high and competition can thus be 
expected to be fierce. However, route-by-route tendering could increase the planning-
costs of urban transport, since the local authority must coordinate a large set of services 
provided by different operators in order to have a well integrated network. This 
tendering procedure could more successfully be used to assign inter-city routes than 
urban ones. 
• Network tendering: implies that all services in an urban or even regional area are 
bunched together and tendered out. Although this method maintains the integrity of the 
network, it presents some disadvantages. The complexity of the services to be provided 
increases the organizational costs of the tendering procedure. Moreover, if one applies 
this procedure to allocate transport services in a large city or a metropolitan area, the 
potential number of bidders would be low. The lower the number of bidders the lower 
the potential benefits from the auction. 
• Sub-set tendering: the service-area to be tendered is divided into sub-set. Each sub-set 
is made of a bunch of routes to be served by the winning bidder. By reducing the area to 
be served one can expect that the number of potential bidders increases, hence that the 
competitive pressure also increases. In addition, the possibility of tendering small units, 
without loss of integration, permits the local authority to compare operators’ 
performance simultaneously (yardstick competition). The main difficulty with route 
bunching is defining the single units to be awarded and their size in order to exploit the 
economies of scale or density and to coordinate and correctly plan the services in the 
whole area.  
                                                                                                                                               
bidder requires to run the services and not a price to pay to get the rights to run the services. For a 
discussion on this issue see also Isotope (1997), Toner (2001) and Boitani, Cambini (2002). 
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Summing up, on the one hand, the definition of a small service area to be assigned, 
for instance a bus line, can guarantee a high level of competition because many 
operators will be able to participate in the tendering process. On the other hand, a small 
service area cannot guarantee the optimal scale of production3.  
There are other relevant aspects in the design of a tendering procedure. First, local 
Authorities should decide either to accurately design ex ante the assigned area (i.e. to 
implement a rigid tender) or to leave some degrees of freedom to the franchisee in 
designing the services, in terms of fares, frequencies of buses, bus routes, quality of 
buses, etc. (non rigid tender). In order to avoid a quality reduction in the provision of 
transport services, local authorities usually set penalties in case of unjustified reduction 
in quality provision. Third, the introduction of quality features in a tender procedure 
generates difficulties in evaluating the overall level of each bid. In this context, the 
selection criteria (i.e. the scoring system) must take into account both the economic and 
technical issues of service provision. While the economic elements can easily be 
quantified, problems of evaluation emerge in assessing quality. The possibility of 
assigning arbitrary weights to different elements of the bid could alter significantly the 
final result of the award process.  
Finally, it is extremely important how the ownership of buses, deposits and other 
equipment is allocated among competitors. The use of infrastructure represents a 
consistent barrier to entry that could prevent new operators from entering the market. If 
the tendering authority owns the infrastructure, then these barriers can be eliminated. 
Otherwise, the tendering authority must oblige the incumbent to transfer the entire 
infrastructure to the potential new operator, but it has to define how to evaluate the 
financial value of these capital goods. This last task is extremely complex due to the 
information asymmetry between the incumbent and the local authority.  
 
 
3. The Italian competitive bidding experience in the local bus industry: an 
overview 
 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the Italian local public transport sector 
has been characterized by increasing costs, sky-rocketing deficits and a declining 
market share. Especially labour costs, which represent 2/3 of the total operating costs, 
have increased over years, while traffic revenues have remained stationary due to a 
combination of low fares (due to distributive concerns) and a consistent shift from 
public to private transport. Although fares have increased substantially since 1992, in 
2004 traffic revenues covered on average only 30% of total operating costs while the 
remaining costs were covered by public subsidies. A few economic indicators of the 
local bus industry in selected European countries can be found in Table 1. It can be seen 
that the Italian local bus industry has the second-highest unit cost (behind Germany), the 
highest unit labour cost and the second lowest labour productivity (behind Belgium). 
Although traffic revenues per km in Italy are not the lowest in Europe, the Italian local 
bus industry turns out to be the most heavily subsidised. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See for example Cambini, Filippini (2003) and Cambini, Piacenza, Vannoni (2006). 
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1,08 1,49 2,39 1,14 1,07 0,98 1,00 1,34 1,30 
Operating 
osts per km 
(€) 
3,5 1,8 4,0 2,9 1,9 2,4 3,0 2,7 2,78 
Revenue/cost 
ratio % 30,7 84,2 60,5 39,2 55,4 40,0 33,1 52,1 49 
Standard 




0,80 1,13 0,97 1,32 1,76 1,44 1,33 1,33 1,25 
Monthly pass 
(€) 30,00 41,33 51,19 45,80 44,02 47,20 32,54 43,68 41.72 
Labour cost 




per employee  
17060 20592 17761 20506 23423 18275 10018 19763 18233 
Source: Earchimede (2005). 
 
In some Italian regions competitive tendering procedures were planned in order to 
improve the poor cost performance of local bus companies and reduce public subsidies. 
Table 2 summarises the available information on the Italian tendering procedures, as of 
December 2005. In particular, Table 2 contains information on the contractual form, 
duration of the contracts, the size of the service area and the size of the area tendered, as 
a percentage of the total.  
Only four regions have tendered out more than 50% of total bus-km of the service-
area (Valle d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lombardia and Toscana), while in Emilia 
Romagna only 34% of the total area was actually tendered out, but competitive 
tendering is still taking place in the residual area (Table 2). In Lombardia all the service-
area has been tendered out, except for the metropolitan area of Milan, that accounts for 
about bus-km 120 mln. In some southern regions (Sicily, Apulia, Sardinia and Calabria) 
competitive tendering of local bus service did not even start, whilst in other southern 
and central regions (Campania, Basilicata, Marche, Umbria) competitive tendering is 
slowly starting. In some northern regions, like Piemonte and Veneto, competitive 
tendering didn’t take place, except for a few isolated experiences. In all these areas, the 
normative uncertainty mentioned above and a good deal of political opportunism lead 
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d’Aosta Net cost 
6+3 
years 6.545.500 6.545.500 100% 6.545.500 100% 100% 
Liguria Net cost 6 +3 years 69.000.000 53.962.700 78% 14.962.700 22% 28% 
Piemonte Net cost 6 years 120.000.000 2.748.065 0,02% 2.748.065 0,02% 100% 
Lombardia Net cost 7 years 275.379.176 145.884.290 53% 139.307.896 50% 95% 












108.000.000 112.006.557 103% 37.181.176 34% 33% 
Toscana Net cost 5 years 117.000.000 120.965.842 103% 120.965.842 100% 100% 
Umbria Net cost 6 years 30.274.724 30.274.724 100% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Marche n.a. n.a. 51.800.000 43.000.000 83% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lazio Gross cost 3 years n.a. 22.500.000 Additional services 22.500.000 n.a. 100% 
Campania  n.a. n.a. 158.000.000 2.490.642 1,57% 2.490.642 1,57% 100% 
Puglia  n.a. n.a. n.a. 33.072.549 n.a. 9.681.678 n.a. 29% 
Basilicata Net cost 5 years n.a. 28.000.000 n.a. 1.900.000 n.a. 6,79% 
*It refers to the urban area of Vicenza. No one had participated in the bidding procedure. The service is still offered 
by the incumbent. 
 
As for the contractual features of tendered services, it seems that net cost contracts are 
predominant, whilst the contract duration varies in different regions. Regarding the 
definition of the service-area, one can observe that a homogeneous criterion to define 
the size of the bus service area does not exist. In particular, the regional authorities 
normally choose the size of the service area by using the province or municipal 
jurisdictional boundaries, aggregating sometimes urban and inter-cities transport 
services, disregarding potential economies of scale and density. The design of 
competitive tendering procedures so far does not seem to give correct incentives to 
mergers of transport operators or at least to efficiently aggregate bunches of routes in 
nearby areas. Indeed, the Italian local transport market is still composed of a great 
number of small or even very small operators, contrary to what is going on in many EU 
countries, like Sweden and the UK. 
Tendering procedures in Italy do not generally regard single lines but large or small 
networks. In some cases, especially in small and medium-sized Italian provinces, urban 
and inter-city routes are bundled for tender, in order to let the winning firm cross-
subsidize the unprofitable urban services with the more profitable intercity services and 
thus reduce the subsidy to be given to the winning bidder4. 
In all the above-mentioned experiences, local governments maintain the ownership of 
infrastructures and buses. Tipically, these capital goods are given for free to the winning 
bidder but have to be returned to the local authority when the franchise expires. Finally, 
the competitive tendering was won almost everywhere by the incumbent operator, 
sometimes in joint venture with other local transport operators, with very limited 
savings with respect to the reserve price: 4% reduction on average in Val d’Aosta, and 
                                                 
4 The winner of the competitive tendering procedure is typically the company ready to offer a pre-defined 
transport service asking for the least amount of public subsidies. 
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3% in Friuli, while in other regions, like Lombardia, the reduction was even lower (1% 
on average) (Table 3). A special case is Tuscany. Here, the bidding procedures were 
designed with the objective of increasing the supply of transport services, and so the 
total bus-kilometers to be provided by the winning bidder. If the additional services 
offered in the tender by the winning bidders are taken into account, the average 
reduction in Tuscany reaches 4,3%. 
 
Table 3: Selected results of competitive bidding in Italy. 
Regions 
Average reduction for 
winning bids 
Ex post presence of Incumbent 
Valle d’Aosta 4% 100% 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 3% 100% 
Liguria n.d 75%* 
Lombardia 1% - urban areas: 90%* 
- suburban areas:  95,5% 
Emilia Romagna 0,5%** 100% 
Toscana 0,01% 100% 
*The bidding procedures in Como and Albenga, both won by new entrants, were revoked by the Regional 
Administrative Tribunal (TAR). 
** Only for the area for which official data are available 
Source: Boitani, Cambini (2004a); Cambini, Galleano (2005) 
 
The tendering procedures in Lazio deserve further explanations. These procedures 
actually refer to the case of Rome only, since no tendering procedures took place in 
other towns or provinces within that region. The early competitive tendering procedures 
organised in Rome were limited to additional transport services, consisting of new lines 
for the 2000 Jubilee (J routes) and of 15 additional million bus-km divided in two sets 
(8 and 7,5 million bus-km, respectively). A complete picture of the competitive 
tendering in Rome can be drawn from Table 4. These new routes integrate bus-km 115 
million provided, with a non-tendered concession, by the incumbent operator, the 
publicly owned Trambus. A joint venture - lead by Sita (owned by the national railways 
operator, Ferrovie dello Stato), with some local operators (Arpa - Chieti, Apm – 
Perugia) and the French company Transdev - was able to win all of the three early 
franchises.  
In the first and second tenders the incumbent operator, Trambus, was not allowed to 
make an offer in order to favour the entry of new transport operators. As can be seen in 
Table 4, this decreased the competitive pressure in the bid, leading to a reduction of 
approximately 8% of the reserve price. In the third tender, however, Trambus’s bid was 
admitted but the offer of the new entrant was better. In this last case, the reduction was 
25%, the highest reduction ever seen in Italy for whatever transport tendering 
procedure.  
The fourth tender contained a bundle of the previous additional services, plus some 
additional ones, for a total of 26,5 mln bus-km per year. Trambus was not admitted to 
the tender won by a new consortium of transport operators called “Tevere S.p.A”, once 
again led by Sita. The French operator Transdev didn’t take part in the consortium. The 
reserve price was € 2,37 per bus-km (gross cost), which was the actual transfer given in 
2005 (after allowing for RPI-indexation) to the previous operator and the winning bid 
was € 2,36 per bus-km: a tiny 0,42% reduction. 
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Table 4: Competitive tendering in Rome (additional services). 















Set 1: Jubilee 


































Source: Boitani, Cambini (2002); Atac (unpublished data). 
Figure 1 shows the compensation paid per bus-km varies widely across tendered 
areas. Such a variance is partly due to the fact that some contracts are gross cost (Lazio 
and some in Emila Romagna) whilst most of them are net cost (hence compensations 
are equal to subsidies). The variance may also be due to the service-mix effect and to 
many other differences in the type of service provided. However an average 
compensation of € 1,78 per bus-km in tendered services is more than 19% lower than 
the average compensation for both tendered and non tendered services (€ 2,2) reported 
in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average compensation per bus*km (urban + inter cities services) 
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The compensations per bus-km in selected tendered areas of different regions are 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3. It turns out that the average compensation for urban 
services is higher than the one for intercity services due to the higher cost of urban 
transport (lower speed and higher traffic congestion). Comparing the data for some 
regions we can observe that the average compensation value in Lombardia for urban 
services is equal to € 1,91 per km, while it is equal to € 1,44 per km for inter-city 
services. The average for urban and inter-city services is equal to € 1,77 per bus-km, 
while in Toscana it is equal to € 1,71 and in Emilia Romagna € 1,97. Note that the value 
in Emilia is higher than the other ones because of the fact that in some areas of Emilia 
gross cost contract are in place, while in the other regions (except Lazio) only net cost 
contract are used. 
As for strictly urban services, Figure 2 shows a high variance in compensations, 
ranging from € 1,43 in Varese to € 2,60 in Crema. Whilst the high compensation in 
Sondrio may be explained by taking into account the high share of mountain-routes in 
the service-area, the same explanation does not fit for the case of Crema. The altimetry 
of the service-area may also serve as an explanation for the high compensations paid in 
Aosta 2 and Aosta 3 (which both encompass services in the mountain valleys of that 




Figure 2: Compensation for urban services in selected towns and cities. 
Note: Rome 1,2,3, gross cost contracts. 
Source: Cambini, Galleano (2005). 
 
It is fair to say that no definite pattern emerges from the available data. Competition 
through franchise bidding hasn’t lead yet to a convergence of the cost of local bus 
services towards some common value. The actual compensations paid by local 
authorities to the franchisees seem to be determined more by the past level of costs than 
by the levelling effect of competition. 









































































 Average value = 1,91 
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When commenting on these results it should be considered that regional regulations 
require that, if an old operator is substituted by a new entrant, all the employees of the 
incumbent automatically become employees of the new franchisee on the same terms 
and conditions. Such “social clauses” may be justified because of the absence of any 
unemployment benefit for laid off workers in the Italian local transport industry. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult for a potential entrant to make a truly competitive bid when 
more than 60% of its cost (i.e. labour cost) is bound to be exactly the same as that of the 
incumbent and productivity is also bound to beclose to the one of the incumbent. The 
Italian Competition Commission denounced the anti-competitive nature of these “social 
clauses” and the results of the early tenders in Rome - where no “social clause” was 
imposed as the new entrants did not bite in the services of the incumbent – showed that 




Figura 3: Compensation for inter-cities services in selected areas. 
Source: Cambini, Galleano (2005). 
 
It should also be observed that, in many cases, local governments failed to define 
precisely the service to be provided by the franchisee and retained large discretion as to 
the re-definition of the service to be provided5. The expected uncertainties may have 
discouraged some potential bidders and, due to the limited number of bidders, it is not 
surprising that the outcomes of competition are rather weak. Incumbent operators – 
mainly owned by local governments – not only had better information on the actual 
                                                 
5 This seems to be a feature shared with the unsatisfactory French experience mentioned above (Yvrande-
Billon, 2005). 













































































































Average value = 1,51 
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state of the network and of the fleet but also had a lower “political risk” (Williamson, 
1976) as they could be confident that their shareholders would not let them go bankrupt 
in any unforeseen and unfavourable state of the world. Moreover, it has been observed 
(Boitani, Cambini, 2004a) that many tenders were “tailor-made” for the incumbents, i.e. 
that many local authorities designed the auctions in such a way as to put their own 
enterprises in an advantageous position. 
As a consequence of the above mentioned features of the awarding procedures, no 
foreign competitor dared to enter the market, except the French company Transdev, 
which joined other Italian operators in the early tenders in Rome. Recently Transdev 
decided not to participate in the new bidding procedure for services in Rome and bought 
a controlling share of Genova’s bus company. The British company Arriva chose to take 
over a private operator (Sab-Bergamo) in order to get hold of the market and 
institutional information of an Italian incumbent and, by doing so, to reduce its future 
bidding risks. Another consequence of the fact that the winners of the tendering 
procedures were almost everywhere the old local public operators is that no new Italian 
“player” grew up in the market so as to be able to take full advantage of scale and scope 




The definition of appropriate regulatory policies for unprofitable public utilities is a 
difficult task. As argued by Segal (1998), the incentive for unprofitable monopolistic 
firms, like a local public transport operator, to reduce its cost and increase revenue is 
low, particularly when the regulator has a reputation for bail out. In other words, if the 
regulator is benevolent, the firm tends to under-invest (i.e. reduce its effort) in order to 
become unprofitable and extract higher public subsidies. This is, in a nutshell, the soft 
budget constraint disease, the welfare losses of which are typically higher than the 
dead-weight cost of monopoly. 
Since Demsetz (1968) competitive tendering is viewed as a tool that local 
governments can use to benefit from the incentives towards efficiency entailed by ex 
ante competition. However Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) warned that 
franchise bidding may be difficult to implement in practice and that potential gains from 
competition may be overcome by the burden of transaction costs that characterise 
inevitably incomplete contracts (Crocker, Masten, 1996). Many European local public 
transport services are now subject to competitive tendering. Some experiences (Sweden, 
Finland, UK) show that competitive tendering leads to lower costs and better service-
quality. The French experience turns out to be less positive.  
The Italian tendering experience in the bus industry is limited and does not allow to 
reach a definite conclusion; however in the previous sections it was argued that the 
results might have been far more encouraging if the tenders were organised in another 
way. We agree with Yvrande-Billon (2005, p. 20) when she points out that a 
disappointing experience “does not mean that this mechanism of coordination could not 
yield positive results and has to be abandoned” and that “competitive tendering cannot 
be beneficial if certain conditions are not respected”.  
With regard to the Italian experience the conditions to be fulfilled to have truly 
beneficial competitive tendering may be summarised as follows. The first and hardest 
condition is the willingness of local authorities to see their own firms thrown out of the 
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market if less efficient than potential entrants. This in turns depends on the willingness 
to give up political rents accruing from the ownership of local public enterprises. The 
national government may strengthen the “propensity to competition” of local authorities 
by setting appropriate financial sticks and carrots (Boitani, Tocci, 2005). The second 
condition is the extension of unemployment benefits to local transport workers, in order 
to drop those “social clauses” that are burdening all the Italian awarding procedures 
(Scarpa, Boitani, et al., 2005). The third condition is guaranteeing fair tenders, which 
implies that local authorities are not in charge of the procedure whenever their own 
company is allowed to make a bid. In such a case an independent agency should take up 
the task (Scarpa, Boitani, et al., 2005). This agency might also help local authorities in 
the definition of many technical aspects of the service, thus reducing post-contractual 
uncertainty and making bidding less risky. However the very existence of such an 
agency might not be popular with the local authorities, as some power would be taken 
away from them and transferred to the agency.  
If it were too hard to fulfil these conditions it seems reasonable to revert – at least as 
an interim measure - to a different route to strengthen the incentives of unprofitable 
local public buses, that is introducing a mechanism aimed at reducing the real value of 
subsidies over time: for short a subsidy cap (SC)6. Such a mechanism is indeed one of 
the provisions of the Italian 1997 reform, according to which public subsidies should 
not exceed 65% of operating costs and should decline over time in force of a cap 
explicitly aimed at increasing the X-efficiency of the industry. Despite the law, only few 
Italian local governments appear to have reverted to the SC. The same mechanism was 
introduced in Norway in a “menu” where also yardstick competition and competitive 
tendering were listed as alternatives to replace individual cost-plus negotiations. As 
documented by Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2003) SC contracts rapidly outnumbered cost-
plus contracts and yardstick competition contracts and were able to deliver a yearly 
percentage cost reduction greater than the one delivered by tardistick competition and 
cost plus contracts. 
Performance based contracts advocated by Hensher and Houghton (2004) as an 
alternative to tendering in order to maximise some measure of the social surplus are 
more sophisticated than SC but also require well informed regulators and are difficult to 
implement. If the top ranking objective is subsidy savings, a SC contract may be 
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This article reviews the recent experience of franchising metropolitan public transport services in 
Melbourne, Australia, to assess the extent to which the declared objectives of the franchising have been 
achieved. The failure of the initial franchise process is argued to be attributable, in significant part, to 
shortcomings in the Government’s understanding of what was achievable from a public-private initiative 
of this nature, given the Melbourne context. Developments associated with the re-franchising process are 
summarised, the emphasis shifting towards a strong partnership relationship between purchaser and 
provider, with a more realistic risk allocation between the two. 
 






There have been significant changes in the delivery of many public transport services 
over the past two decades. From public monopolies functioning as both regulator and 
service provider, it is now increasingly common to see the service delivery role passed 
to the private sector. More recently, the public sector’s role in system design has also 
come into question, with suggestions that that role too should pass to the private sector. 
This change process has been driven by expectations of lower costs to government, 
from more efficient service delivery by the private sector, and better service delivery 
outcomes, from a service provider more attuned to meeting customer needs. 
Melbourne, a city of about 3.5 million people in the state of Victoria, is the only 
Australian city to have franchised both its passenger train and tram networks. The 
franchising occurred in August, 1999, as part of a much wider privatisation push by the 
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Victorian (and other Australian Governments) at the time. In late 2002, just three years 
into the franchise period (of 12 years for tram services, 15 for train and 10 for country 
passenger services), the major franchisee failed. In 2004, the re-franchising of all 
metropolitan train and tram services was completed, confirming the failure of the initial 
franchising process.  
This paper reviews Melbourne’s experience with rail franchising and subsequent re-
franchising, to assess what lessons might be learnt for the delivery of efficient and 
effective public transport services in a privatised operating environment. It begins with 
a review of some significant developments in public transport service provision in 
Melbourne prior to the initial franchising. The developments in that period were 
significant in terms of the subsequent franchising outcomes. Those outcomes are then 
discussed and reasons for the failure of the franchising process are suggested. This is 
followed by discussion of how some lessons from the initial franchising have informed 
the re-franchising process. The re-franchising demonstrates a major shift in approach: 
from a competitively tendered arm’s length relationship to a partnership, founded on 
trust and mutual understanding, with the expectation that this change will deliver a more 
sustainable outcome and better goal achievement.  
 
 
Corporatisation and the goals of franchising Melbourne’s rail services 
 
In the early 1990s, Melbourne undertook a major public transport reform program. 
This program involved the creation of a state-owned Public Transport Commission and 
the corporatisation, as five separate entities, of two metropolitan tram services, two 
metropolitan train services, and one regional train/bus service (the latter service is 
outside the scope of this paper).  
In 1998, shortly prior to the move to franchising, the Victorian Auditor-General 
(1998) reported that these reforms had achieved substantial recurrent cost savings 
(about $250 million annually), mainly through labour shedding. The Auditor General 
concluded that the transport reform program had produced a number of benefits: it had 
reduced the call of public transport on the Victorian taxpayer; improved service 
reliability, with the notable exception of the peak period reliability of the suburban train 
fleet, and its aged rolling stock; improved punctuality, but not to world class standards; 
reversed declining patronage trends; and, improved service availability. However, he 
also noted that (VAG 1998: 8): 
 
After 6 years of cost-cutting and rationalisation of operations, there appears 
to be limited scope for further large savings to be achieved in an environment 
where a substantial proportion of existing rolling stock will need replacement 
over the next few years. 
 
This warning was lost in the subsequent franchising process. 
The Victorian State Government’s primary motivation in franchising the five 
corporatised services was to further reduce the public transport call on the public purse. 
There were, however, five declared goals. These involved a balance between financial 
and service delivery outcomes (DOI 2004: 6): 
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1. to secure a progressive improvement in the quality of services available to public 
transport users in the State; 
2. to secure a substantial and sustained increase in the number of passengers using 
the system; 
3. to minimise long term costs of public transport to the taxpayer; 
4. to transfer risk to the private sector; and, 
5. to ensure achievement of the highest safety standards. 
 
Based on the successful bids, the franchised operations were expected to produce a 
progressive improvement in service quality available to public transport users, with 
service delays reduced by about 40% over 10 years, a planned 11% increase in services 
over 10 years, $1.5 billion investment by the private sector in new/upgraded rolling 
stock and $0.8 billion invested to renew existing infrastructure, leading to a substantial 
and sustained total increase in public transport patronage of 71% over 15 years. At the 
same time, the highest safety standards would be achieved and maintained.  
These outcomes were to be achieved at much reduced long term costs of public 
transport for the taxpayer, with cost savings of more than $1.8 billion in real terms 
predicted over 15 years, or about $160 million annually in constant prices and present 
value terms (DTF 2000: 143). Because the franchisees would assume revenue, operating 
and legal risk, except in limited circumstances, risk transfer to the private sector would 
be achieved.  
 
 
The initial franchises 
 
The National Express Group (NEX) won the franchise to provide one of the two 
metropolitan train services, one of the two metropolitan tram services and the regional 
passenger service. The franchises for the remaining metropolitan train service and 
remaining metropolitan tram service went to Connex and Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd 
respectively, the latter operating as Yarra Trams.3  
The franchises commenced late in 1999 but, within two years, franchisees had advised 
the government of financial difficulties. In early 2002, the state government committed 
an additional $105 million to the franchisees. Part of the payment was described as 
“settling outstanding contractual disputes from the time of franchising,” but the full 
amount was widely interpreted in local media at the time as a bailout.  
In late 2002, NEX ceased operations, a receiver was appointed, and interim operating 
arrangements were agreed with Connex and Yarra Trams. These interim arrangements 
subsequently led to re-franchising, with Connex to operate the entire train network and 
Yarra the entire tram network. The new agreements commenced in April 2004. In 
essence, the initial four metropolitan franchise agreements were replaced with two 




                                                 
3 Connex was owned by the French firm Veolia Environnement; Metrolink was a joint venture between 
French Company Transdev and Transfield. 
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Financial outcome of the franchising/re-franchising 
 
The primary motive for franchising was to reduce the call on the public purse from 
subsidisation of public transport services. Figure 1 shows projected payments to 
franchisees over the period to 2009. It shows aggregate fixed operating payments from 
government declining to zero by 2009 and franchisee remuneration increasingly 
depending on incentive payments, related to patronage increase (revenue gain) and 
operational performance, plus payments for capital programs (essentially 
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Figure 1: Expected Periodic Payments to Melbourne Public Transport Franchisees - 2000 to 2009 (1999 
prices).  
Source: DTF (2000). 
 
At the time it announced the re-franchising, the State Government indicated an 
increased cost to Government of an expected $200 million annually, compared to the 
franchise bids. Once allowance is made for inflation, the additional $200 million 
compares reasonably closely with the $160 million or so annual savings projected 
through the lives of the franchises. 
In September, 2005, the Victorian Auditor General reviewed the re-franchising 
process (VAG, 2005). That review found that the cost of operating Melbourne’s train 
and tram services has remained largely stable following franchising and re-franchising 
and is expected to stay at about the same levels, with the exception of the cost of new 
rolling stock. Payments to both franchisees increased by $330 million in 2004-05, and 
were expected to stay at about this level above the initial franchise projections, most of 
this being needed to secure the franchisees’ operations, with the government taking on 
additional risks. The initial estimate of a $200 million annual shortfall thus appears to 
be low. 
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The Auditor General’s report also points out that the franchise review and re-
franchising team cost Victorian taxpayers some $38 million (VAG 2005: 27), including 
both consultants and in-house staff. Earlier advice to government from the Franchise 
Review Task Force had estimated the costs of re-tendering or renegotiating at $20 
million. Had the re-franchising involved a new open tender round, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the incurred costs of $38 million would have been higher still. Transaction 
costs were thus very significant sums in the re-franchising process. 
The initial franchising process delivered financial savings in the three years to 2002, 
largely courtesy of the shareholders of the franchisees and, in the case of NEX, its 
creditors. However, the savings projected by the successful franchisees were 
unsustainable long term. Expectations have now been adjusted to more realistic levels. 
Most of the financial gains to be achieved from the reform of Melbourne’s public 
transport system were delivered prior to franchising. The objective of reducing the call 
on the public purse from franchising has not been met and, in reality, was never likely to 
be met. 
If the move to franchised services has not reduced the long term costs of public 
transport for the taxpayer, to what extent has it achieved the other declared goals of 
franchising? These goals were: a progressive improvement in the quality of services 
available to public transport users; a substantial and sustained increase in the number of 
passengers using the system; achievement of the highest safety standards; and, risk 
transfer to the private sector.  
 
 
Improvement in quality of services 
 
The Victorian Department of Infrastructure reports several service quality indicators 
that allow some conclusions on trends in service quality to be drawn (DOI, various 
issues). Figure 2 reports overall train and tram on-time running outcomes for the period 
before and after franchising, including both the initial and re-franchising period 
performance under the “franchise” data series.4 Not surprisingly, train on-time running 
performance exceeds that by tram, since Melbourne’s extensive tram system primarily 
operates in mixed traffic flows, unlike the trains. The Figure suggests that train 
performance initially improved, as it had been doing pre-franchising, but that 
performance has deteriorated over the past two years.  
Some key reasons for this deterioration in train on-time running in recent times are 
unrelated to the franchising/re-franchising process. The Victorian rail system has 
suffered from a lack of infrastructure investment for many years, with growing track 
congestion a consequence. In such circumstances, delays to one train can contribute to 
delays to others, particularly in the peak. Also, over the past year, Melbourne rail 
patronage has grown considerably, driven by high and rising fuel prices. This has 
increased train dwell times and had flow-on network delay consequences. 
Figure 2 shows that tram on-time running performance has generally tended to 
decline, that decline being marked in the period after the NEX collapse but with a 
suggestion of some recent recovery. The remaining tram operator, Yarra Trams, 
                                                 
4 Based on averaging the outcomes for the two train and tram operators, when separate companies 
existed.  
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 54-68 
 59
attributes much of deterioration to increasing levels of traffic congestion. For example, 
over the most recent five years, average tram operating speeds have declined by 8% (to 
15.5 kph). The tram operator has agreed a major program with the State Government 
(called Think Tram), aimed at providing increased operating priority, to deal with the 
growing congestion problem. This program has a target of 25% improvement in average 
end-to-end journey time. The more recent improvements are likely to be due to better 
operating practices and the improved rolling stock. 
On the available evidence, then, it seems that the franchised and re-franchised 
operations have not achieved much in terms of improving service punctuality but that 
some key reasons for these outcomes may be attributable to factors outside the control 
of franchisees. It can certainly be argued, however, that franchisees should have better 
understood these influences on the operating environment in which they were to be 
working and made more sanguine forecasts of what would be achieved under their 
system management. The same comment applies to those managing the initial 






























Figure 2: On-time Running Performance: Melbourne’s Trains and Trams. 
Source: Derived from DOI, various issues; 2005 data is to the September Quarter. 
 
Figure 3 reports service cancellations on metropolitan train and tram services, as an 
indicator of reliability. The data suggest early improvement for train and then a 
substantial fall-off in performance, into the re-franchise period. Tram has shown a small 
deterioration. 
The train result is most likely related to issues such as a shortage of drivers and 
deferred maintenance, suggesting that financially-pressured franchisees under-invested 
in training and maintenance as they struggled to survive. The position is compounded 
by the long lead times on driver recruitment and training, with a 78 week period being 
the norm in Victoria to achieve a fully trained driver. A future measure of the success of 
the re-franchise process will be how quickly service cancellations are reduced, as the 
train driver shortage is overcome.  
 


























Figure 3: Service Cancellations: Melbourne’s Trains and Trams. 
Source: Derived from DOI, various issues; 2005 data is to the September Quarter. 
 
Service quality improvements were expected from rolling stock upgrades and these, in 
turn, were expected to improve patronage. The upgrading of the tram fleet is probably 
the most visible outcome of the privatisation process. Upgrading the train fleet has been 
slower. Overall, the rolling stock upgrade program appears to have been delivered on-
time and on-budget, with few operational performance problems. It is likely that the 
new vehicles would not have been introduced had it not been for the prospect of 
substantial cost savings from franchising.  
A negative aspect of the rolling stock upgrade program was the decisions by the train 
and tram franchisees’, respectively, to acquire their own types of rolling stock from 
their own preferred suppliers. For example, on the tram network Yarra Trams and NEX 
(M-Tram) purchased new low floor vehicles for their respective networks from separate 
suppliers. Floor heights were different, resulting in the creation of two sets of platform 
heights and limiting network integration under the re-franchised arrangements. This is 
an example of some of the problems that arose from the idea of comparator competition 
(two train and two tram operators competing by comparison), problems that led to re-
franchising of whole train and tram networks, not separate parts of each. 
Increased services were expected to involve increased operating kilometres. In the 
three years from 1999/2000 to 2002/03, State Budget papers reveal that total kilometres 
operated by trains and trams on the Melbourne metropolitan network increased by 
almost 5%. This rate of increase was lower than that achieved over the period 
immediately prior to franchising but was in line with the franchise expectation that 
services would increase by about 11% over 10 years. However, because of the 
importance of service frequency and coverage in generating patronage increases on 
Melbourne’s public transport services, an 11% projected increase in service kilometres 
was never going to support patronage increases of the projected 71%, particularly given 
the high loading rates on many peak rail services. 
Victorian public transport services have a long history of regular measurement and 
reporting of customer satisfaction. These surveys suggest that customer satisfaction has 
increased for tram but not for train (Fig. 4). Both tram operators achieved increased 
customer satisfaction levels during their initial franchises, most likely associated with 
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fleet upgrading. Tram customer satisfaction levels have stabilised more recently under 
the single franchise, at levels above those of the pre-franchise period. Customer 
satisfaction levels increased for both train operators for several years but have fallen 
noticeably over the past two years, as service cancellations have increased and on-time 
running has worsened. 
Market research conducted for the franchisees suggests that dissatisfaction with the 
ticketing system (an issue on trams in particular) and concerns about perceived security 
around rail stations, both of which are beyond the scope of the franchise agreements, 
may partly explain why customer satisfaction levels have not increased to any extent. 
Franchisees report increased marketing efforts in an attempt to communicate 
improvements in these areas to their customers. Overall, however, there appears to be a 
hangover from the failed initial franchises that is still exerting an influence, especially in 
























Figure 4: Customer Satisfaction with Melbourne’s Trains and Trams. 




Solid patronage increases have been achieved. For example, total patronage increased 
by 5.3% over the two years to 2002/03, under the initial franchises. This was a good 
result, by comparison with the preceding period, but was still about one percentage 
point per annum less than was expected from the franchise bids. This shortfall in 
patronage was very significant in the financial problems of franchisees, because their 
revenue streams were closely linked to their patronage forecasts. 
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Over the six years to 2004/05, total train and tram patronage increased by 21.5%. This 
was faster than the rate of growth in metropolitan car use over the same period but was 
still below what the franchisees had forecast in their initial franchise bids. However, 
2004/05 growth was in line with expectations under the re-franchising arrangements, 
which were more modest. 
High oil prices in more recent times have helped to lift the rate of patronage increase, 
particularly on train. This has led to crush loading on some peak services, with adverse 
consequences for customer satisfaction. This outcome clearly reflects the dissonance in 
franchise bids between the forecast low increases in service kilometres and high 
increases in patronage levels. The capital equipment of the rail system, in particular, 
could not sustain large patronage increases with only very small increases in service 
kilometres, except if there was a very dramatic (and implausible) shift away from peak 





Although safety improvements were an objective of the franchising process, no data is 
published to allow assessment of such factors. Some franchisees claim significant 





The financial events of the past few years suggest that any risk transfer that was 
achieved from the initial franchising was temporary. Additional payments were made to 
franchisees, one franchisee failed financially and State payments have been increased to 
sustain services. The main beneficiaries seem to be the surviving train and tram 
operators, who are seeing their franchises expanded in spatial coverage, albeit with a 
shortened time span.  
 
 
Some benefits from the initial franchising 
 
While the Melbourne initial rail franchising process did not deliver against its major 
aims of cutting the cost of train and tram services to the public purse and shifting risk to 
the private sector, there were a number of benefits that deserve mention (apart from the 
short term cost savings, fleet upgrade, small increase in service kilometres and some 
improvements in service quality noted above). 
The performance monitoring system established during the franchise process, and 
which has generated most of the performance indicators cited in this paper, is a useful 
advance in public accountability and provides good benchmarking information. The 
franchising process itself was complex but met high probity standards, as did the 
subsequent re-franchising process (VAG 2005). To the credit of the Victorian 
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Government, when financial failure was imminent, it was prepared to allow this to 
happen and deal with the politically tough issues this raised.5 
 
 
Why did franchising fail to deliver? 
 
In its review of the initial franchise process, the Department of Infrastructure 
concluded that there were four main reasons for the failure (DOI 2004: 9). These 
reasons were: 
 
• unrealistic assumptions by the bidders in relation to patronage growth and cost 
reduction (by far the most significant influencing factor in DOI’s view); 
• flaws in, and disputes over, the contractual arrangements (e.g. over revenue 
sharing arrangements, where disputation was common and distracting, partly 
due to problems with the methodology used to distribute revenue between 
franchisees); 
• poor performance of the ticketing system (which led to revenue loss); and, 
• the introduction of the Commonwealth Government’s Goods and Services Tax 
(which contributed to patronage and revenue loss for which the operators were 
not fully compensated). 
 
DOI (2004: 9) comments that bidders were strongly influenced by buoyant growth 
rates in the UK public transport sector, that an intensely competitive bid process led to 
“bid fever” and that bidders failed to take account of the very different conditions in 
Victoria (compared to the UK).  
These factors are obviously important but they do not appear to be a complete 
explanation. A seasoned transport planner looking at the bidders’ projections prior to 
the franchise operation proceeding would almost certainly conclude that the anticipated 
gains and improvements simply did not add up. With the franchise operations being 
introduced following a period of significant cost-cutting, it was difficult to see that 
further major cost savings could be achieved. Also, the forecasts of patronage growth 
were inconsistent with the planned growth in service kilometres, suggesting a likely 
revenue shortfall, even allowing for operators being possibly able to make some inroads 
into the high level of fare evasion on the Melbourne system. In short, the bids were 
never going to be sustainable! 
This raises several questions about both the franchisees and the overall franchising 
process. First, given that the franchisees were experienced international operators, the 
possibility of “winner’s curse” (or bid fever) due to carelessness or ignorance seems 
difficult to accept in full. One possible suggestion is that the franchisees were simply 
buying market share, with a view to subsequent upwards contract price adjustments 
achieved by playing “capture the regulator”, a game noted by other observers of 
franchising processes (see, for example, Alexanderson and Hulten (2003) who analysed 
                                                 
5 This situation was helped by the fact that the Government that was faced with dealing with the franchise 
failure was not the one in office when the initial franchising occurred. Interestingly, the failure does not 
seem to have increased the political probability of the decision to privatise service delivery being 
reversed. 
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competitive tenders in Swedish public transport). Arguably, it is easier for a government 
to increase payments to an existing financially troubled franchisee and continue services 
than it is to face the political odium of major service disruptions. The widespread 
perception of bailout payments in early 2002 gives some credence to this possibility. 
However, the more important questions should be directed at the franchising process 
and those conducting it, questions that were not addressed in the report of the DOI 
franchise review (DOI 2004) or in the recent Auditor General’s review of the re-
franchising process (VAG 2005).  
Macario (2001) emphasises the importance of an integrated system-wide approach to 
policy, planning and service delivery in public transport. The long term franchising of 
any individual components of the system will have the greatest chance of achieving a 
government’s intended outcomes from the franchising process if the policy (strategic) 
level and system-wide planning/development (tactical) levels are in place to bind 
government policy outcome goals with service delivery (at the operational level).  
The Melbourne franchising process was undertaken without an integrated view of 
how the public transport system as a whole would develop. 10-15 year service delivery 
contracts will always struggle when there are no intact system-wide planning/delivery 
frameworks within which they are located. Arguably, the Victorian Government of the 
late 1990s lost sight of its public transport system, focusing instead on franchising 
separate services. Ironically, the language of the time sought to shift the emphasis in 
public transport operations from a “system” to a “service”. This reflected a desire to 
change the culture in operations from a “supply side” driven public enterprise culture to 
a “demand side” driven private sector activity. However, it appears that the critical 
importance of the overall system, and how its parts work together, got lost in the 
process. Operators compounded this by working in their own “silos”, with little attempt 
at presenting a system-front, possibly understandable in view of their financial 
difficulties. 
The franchising process was run by a group located within State Treasury, firmly 
committed to competitive tendering but with significant gaps in understanding of what 
was feasible in terms of patronage/service quality/cost outcomes in the Melbourne 
setting. Some of those involved had experience of the British privatisation but the prior 
arrangements and operational circumstances in that setting were vastly different to 
Melbourne. Had those managing the initial franchising process understood influences 
like the state of rail infrastructure, the limited capacity that was available to 
accommodate rail patronage growth, the degree of rail track congestion and the 
pervasive influence of traffic congestion on tram operation, they would have been more 
likely to conclude that the initial bids that were accepted were not going to be 
sustainable. 
 
Stanley and Hensher (2004: 49) conclude that:  
 
The ideology of competitive tendering appeared to win out over the professional 
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Lessons from the initial franchising failure 
 
The Victorian franchising experience suggests that a competitive tendering process 
may encourage excessively optimistic forecasts of both revenues and costs, which are 
essentially undeliverable. The recent compelling evidence by Flyvbjerg et al (2003) that 
the large infrastructure projects in all sectors investigated (predominantly 
transportation) exhibited substantial cost overruns supports this proposition on the cost 
side.6 This is not necessarily an argument against competitive tendering per se but it is a 
warning against holding unrealistic outcome expectations from such a process and in 
favour of applying solid professional understanding of what might actually be possible 
when undertaking the bid evaluation processes.  
Lessons from the initial experiment in franchising have had a significant impact on 
the re-franchising process and on more recent public transport system thinking in 
Melbourne. The State Government’s reasons for re-franchising, rather than going to the 
market afresh, are explained as follows (DOI 2004, p. 16): 
 
The alternative to re-tendering was to negotiate with the 
franchisees…Negotiations could achieve the Government’s “one train, one 
tram” objective, retain existing system knowledge and experience, and maintain 
the stability of the public transport system…The challenge in renegotiating the 
franchise contracts with the existing franchisees was the need to demonstrate 
that any resulting deal constituted good value for money for the State. 
 
The government was also concerned about a shortage of prospective bidders and 
recognised that the first round competitive tendering process had delivered a financially 
unsustainable result. Pragmatism was more important the second time round, but with 
careful attention to probity and ensuring value for money (e.g. through use of a public 
sector comparator assessment). The Auditor General’s recent review of the re-
franchising process was complimentary about that process and concluded that good 
value for money had been achieved (VAG 2005). 
While the re-franchise contracts have essentially become management contracts (with 
incentives), the negotiation process that underpinned the contracts, together with the 
subsequent operational environment, have emphasised a partnership relationship, as 
distinct from the purely commercial relationship embodied in the initial franchise. 
Under the new arrangements, several elements reinforce a partnership focus: 
 
• an agreed basis has been established for sharing of risks between government and 
the franchisees, in line with the principle that risk should be allocated to the party 
best able to manage it. This matter is discussed further below, because of its 
centrality to a sustainable partnership; 
• revenues are being shared between service providers in fixed proportions, to 
encourage working together to grow system patronage and fare revenue; 
                                                 
6 Although the levels varied widely, the great majority of cost overruns were in the 10-40% band but 
some notable exceptions are well above this range, such as Boston’s artery/tunnel project (196%), the 
Humber Bridge (UK) (175%), the Shinkensen Joetsu rail line (100%), the Channel tunnel (80%), the 
Paris-Auber-Nanterre rail line (60%) to name but a few examples. 
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• a new private company (Metlink) has been established, owned by the train and tram 
franchisees but with close contractual links with the State’s Director of Public 
Transport and Board level involvement by the bus industry, to handle system-wide 
issues such as system marketing, revenue protection processes, complaint handling 
procedures (i.e. system-wide customer-oriented functions) and system advocacy7; 
• there is provision for franchisees to contribute to development of long term strategic 
plans and major projects. 
 
Risks are now allocated to the party thought likely to be best able to manage them. In 
Victoria’s passenger rail franchises, the franchisee bears almost all cost risks, while the 
State carries responsibility for the long term development of the network. Revenue risk, 
however, is effectively shared through a mechanism which provides for the State to 
provide additional funding to the franchisee when revenue falls below certain defined 
thresholds. Similarly, insurance risks are shared: the franchisee self-insures up to a 
defined “deductible”, whilst the State procures commercial insurance above the 
threshold level and pays the relevant premium.  
Open-book accounting and benchmarking processes are being used to maintain 
transparency and accountability in moving from competitive tendering to a negotiated 
outcome with remaining operators. The process is also now being informed by stronger 
input from people well versed in public transport operations and economics, all 
providing confidence of a more sustainable outcome.  
A clearly enunciated view of the tactical level remains missing but much needed 
groundwork has been done. The Strategic framework against which services and system 
development takes place is now set out in two State Government documents, a 
metropolitan development strategy and supporting transport plan.  
Stanley, Betts and Lucas (2005) and (Duncan 2005) describe key elements of 
effective partnerships in public transport service planning and delivery. Key elements 
include common objectives tied to public policy purposes, shared governance 
arrangements (with emphasis on forging and managing a partnership relationship in the 
pre-contractual phase and sustaining it during the course of the contract), written 
agreements on governance and financing (including risk sharing), and mutual trust 
between the partners.  
Factors likely to encourage trust include confidence in a partner’s capacity to deliver, 
demonstrated good faith in making and keeping arrangements, agreed governance 
arrangements and accountability/transparency arrangements (Stanley, Betts and Lucas 
2005: 11). The current Victorian arrangements are seeking to embody these dimensions. 
The accountability/transparency element, inter alia, serves the valuable purpose of 
protecting the community against any risk that a “trusting partnership” might degenerate 
into a “regulator captured by the provider” relationship.  
In the case of Victoria’s rail franchises, an atmosphere of mutual recrimination, 
following the near-collapse of the original franchise deals, has given way to one of 
genuine partnership. None of the parties wishes to revisit the turbulence of the past. 
Both the State and the private operators have taken “ownership” of the outcomes of re-
franchising, having worked in partnership to forge the contracts and, through that 
process, gained a strong understanding of each other’s aspirations and fears. While 
some service quality indicators cited earlier in the paper have not been moving in the 
                                                 
7 The current author is a director of Metlink. 
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right direction under the re-franchised operation, the partnership relationship has helped 
to facilitate an examination of the reasons behind the trends noted and a willingness to 
work through solutions, some of which have been noted above to be beyond the control 
of current franchisees (e.g. infrastructure condition). 
The re-franchised arrangements operate under management contracts with incentives 
on revenue, operational performance and service quality. The length of contract (5 years 
with the possibility of a short extension) is probably too short to encourage operator 
initiative in some areas. Given the origins of re-franchising, however, the current short 
contract length is understandable. The re-franchisees have been, in effect, given a new 
opportunity to show their credentials. Longer contracts are likely to be on the agenda for 
the next round. 
In Victoria, similar partnership-based principles are also beginning to emerge as the 
basis for new relationships between the State and the bus industry. Representatives of 
the bus industry have committed time and energy to important State-led initiatives, such 
as planning for the Commonwealth Games, for a new smartcard-based ticketing system 
and for improved passenger information services across Melbourne. In return the State 
has endeavoured to mould its own policy positions to accommodate those of the 
industry and has acknowledged the opportunity cost of the operators’ time, through 






The Melbourne process of rail franchising and re-franchising demonstrates a major 
shift in approach by the Victorian State Government, from a competitively tendered 
arm’s length relationship (which failed to achieve its goals) to a partnership, founded on 
trust and mutual understanding, with the expectation that this change will deliver a more 
sustainable outcome and better goal achievement. It is still early days in the re-
franchised arrangements. While some key service indicators are yet to turn around, it is 
acknowledged that this is substantially attributable to factors beyond the control of the 
re-franchisees. The possibility of a contract roll-over at the end of the current 
arrangements, rather than re-tendering, should be a strong incentive for franchisees to be 
co-operative and effective partners and to deliver on those matters that are under their 
control. The Victorian partnership approach is searching for a balance between the 
flexibility needed to respond to change and encourage innovation and the contractual 
obligation needed to assure delivery against goals. The outcome of this experiment in 
relationship-based contracting should add to understanding of what is possible in terms 
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Competition in public transport in Great Britain 
 
Peter White 1∗ 
 






Britain offers a case in which much greater experience of competition in the public transport sector can 
be seen than in other European countries. Examples are drawn from this experience, showing that 
outcomes differ between the long-distance and local markets, price competition functioning much more 
effectively in the former. In many respects, the competitive bidding process may be seen as more 
important and extensive than direct ‘on the road’ inter-operator competition within the same mode over 
the same routes. Experiences from competitive tendering and franchising are reviewed. Contradictions 
between competition policy and wider transport policies remain to be resolved. 
 






The public transport system of Great Britain has experienced a greater degree of 
privatisation and deregulation than any other in Europe, commencing with the Transport 
Act of 1980, which deregulated the express coach market. Such competition has 
occurred both within modes (for example, between bus operators over the same route), 
and between modes (for example, between express coach and rail, and between public 
and private modes). The most obvious form of such competition from the passengers’ 
point of view is that where competing operators offer services over the same route, 
sometimes referred to as ‘on the road competition’, or ‘competition in the market’ in the 
road transport sector. However, the extent of this is not particularly great, and has 
tended to diminish. The other form, which has closer parallels with that found elsewhere 
in Europe, is that ‘for the market’ or ‘off road’ competition, in which a single operator is 
given a contract to run a service, but a competitive bidding process takes place. The 
principal example is the bus network in Greater London. Such bids are usually invited at 
the level of individual routes in the bus sector, but at the level of substantial networks in 
the rail franchising process. 
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The main sequence of events 
 
Until the late 1970s public transport in Britain was provided largely by publicly-
owned operators, especially in terms of the scheduled service network. The national rail 
system was operated by British Rail (BR), a nationalised industry. Most urban bus 
services were provided by operators owned and controlled directly by their local 
authorities (the ‘municipals’), with most rural and regional services provided by 
subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies - the National Bus Company (NBC) in 
England and Wales, and Scottish Bus Group (SBG) in Scotland. London Transport 
directly controlled and owned the underground (metro) system and bus services within 
Greater London. 
In many respects the situation was similar to that found elsewhere in Europe at that 
time (and to some extent still today). There were, however, some differences: no 
significant use was made of sub-contracting services to private operators within a state-
owned network (which was well-established in the regional bus networks of Belgium, 
for example). While most long-distance express coaches were run by NBC and SBG 
subsidiaries, and very few all-year-round services by smaller private companies, there 
was substantial competition between coach and rail on many routes, unlike the situation 
in most other European countries even today. Within the non-scheduled market (for 
example, contracts for transport of schoolchildren awarded by local authorities) strong 
competition has existed for many years, and small private operators played a major role. 
During the 1970s increased levels of financial support were paid to public transport 
operators to ensure continuation of services in low-density areas, to fund capital 
spending, and in some urban areas to finance substantially lower levels of fares and 
higher levels of service than would be justified commercially (notably the South 
Yorkshire conurbation). Concessionary fares (i.e. fares specified for certain categories 
of person at a level lower than operators would charge commercially, in some cases 
permitting free off-peak travel) had become important, especially for pensioners. 
However, there were concerns that large sums were being paid to incumbent operators 
with little influence over their operating efficiency. Innovations in types of service were 
also limited. A shift to a deregulated and privatised market was therefore seen by some 
as a means of offsetting these dangers.  
 
 
Coach and Bus Deregulation 
 
Following the election of a Conservative party government in 1979 a marked shift in 
policy took place. The Transport Act 1980 deregulated the express coach and tourist 
sector, removing the need for route licences or authorisation of fares to be charged. 
However little privatisation initially took place in the public transport services as such: 
for example, the dominant express coach operator, National Express, was not privatised 
until 1988 – the early 1980s period of intensive competition between it and British Rail 
was thus a case of competition between operators both still within the public sector. 
Control of London Transport was transferred in 1984 from the then Greater London 
Council to a state-appointed board. While bus services were not deregulated, a policy of 
private sector tendering for all services was introduced. 
A more radical change emerged through the Transport Act 1985, which deregulated 
local bus services (other than in London and Northern Ireland), removing both fares and 
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service controls. Network-wide financial support was removed, although operators were 
compensated on more consistent basis than before for revenue loss due to concessionary 
fares. It was accepted that not all services would be operated commercially, even if 
sharp reductions in costs occurred, and a system of competitive tendering was 
introduced for those services (for example, in low-density rural areas). Privatisation of 
NBC companies took place in the period 1985-1988, followed by that of the SBG 
subsidiaries. The process was more gradual in the ‘municipal’ sector, and about fifteen 





The Railways Act 1993 introduced a complex system of privatisation for the national 
rail network. The infrastructure was placed under a separate company, Railtrack plc 
(succeeded from 2002 by Network Rail, a semi-public organisation). Freight operations 
were sold directly to private sector businesses, together with the passenger rolling stock 
under rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs). The passenger rail services were 
placed under twenty-five area franchises, for which private sector operators were invited 
to make bids. While some of the changes (notably separation of infrastructure and 
operations) could be seen as requirements imposed by EU policy, Britain went much 
further than any other European country in placing both under private sector ownership. 
As mentioned above, a distinction should be made between privatisation and 
deregulation – in the rail case, it could be argued that greater regulation was introduced 
at the time of privatisation - for example, in control of some fare categories, and 
detailed specification of service levels for passenger operators - than had been the case 
previously, under BR control. Apart from some services in the Passenger Transport 
Executive areas (major cities outside London), revenue risk in rail franchising is taken 
by the franchise operator 
 
 
Change since 1997 
 
The election of the ‘New Labour’ government under Mr Blair in 1997 did not see a 
significant reversal of these policies. Privatised companies have not been returned to 
public ownership and some further small-scale privatisation has taken place in the 
municipal bus sector. A greater emphasis has been placed on integration of services, but 
a striking conflict is found between this aim and the stringent competition policy 
applied in the economy as a whole, which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.  
Under the Transport Act 2000 rail franchising was transferred to the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA), and powers were introduced to permit ‘Quality Contracts’ (QCs) and 
statutory ‘Quality Partnerships’ (SQPs) to be set up, under which some elements of re-
regulation of bus services would be reintroduced. QCs enable arrangements similar to 
those in London to be established in other parts of Britain, while SQPs would enable 
formal quality partnerships to be set up between bus operators and local authorities. So 
far, no QCs have been set up although considerable interest has been expressed in their 
potential by the Passenger Transport Executives. Only one SQP has been set up, in 
Scotland, but informal quality partnerships play a useful role in many areas. The SRA 
has itself been abolished under subsequent legislation, and franchising is now handled 
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directly by the Department for Transport (DfT). Changes under the 2000 Act have in 
practice had relatively little effect, representing a change of emphasis rather than 
substance to changes introduced in the previous two decades. 
A policy of greater significance enacted by the New Labour government has been that 
of devolving powers to elected bodies in certain regions of Britain – the Scottish 
Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Greater London Assembly. The directly-
elected Mayor of Greater London also has extensive transport powers. In London, a 
much higher level of financial support for public transport has been introduced, 
enabling lower real fares and higher service levels to be offered to users, and the 
congestion charge introduced in 2003 has also assisted public transport. However, the 






The London Underground system remains under public ownership, but subsequently 
under Labour a ‘Public Private Partnership‘ (PPP) was introduced in 2003, under which 
thirty-year contracts have been made with two private consortia for maintenance and 
renewal of infrastructure and rolling stock, while direct operations remain under public 
control – in effect, the opposite of the policy adopted in Stockholm for the metro (the 
‘Tunnelbana’) in which competitive franchising has been introduced for service 
operations, but the infrastructure remains under public ownership and control (White 
and Ball 2003). Some small urban rail networks in Tyne & Wear and Glasgow remain 
wholly under public sector control. New light rail systems have been introduced in 
several cities, all operated by private sector companies, with various arrangements for 
funding (most ultimately from the public sector) and duration of franchises. The latter 
may conflict with current European Commission proposals, notably the Croydon 
Tramlink in London, which has a franchise running to 99 years 
 
 
The long-distance market 
 
The role of competition in the long-distance market differs radically from that in the 
local market, generally with more scope for commercially-viable operation. Most of the 
express coach, and domestic air, networks are operated commercially with little need for 
public tendering or franchising except in some very low density areas. Inter-modal 
competition is a striking feature, with rail, air, and coach serving the major trunk routes, 
while rail and coach compete for many lower-density flows. In addition to this, price 
competition appears to function much more effectively than in the intra-urban and local 
markets, associated with a high short-run price elasticity (in the order of –1.0) and a 
greater tendency by users to pre-plan their journeys.  
A partial exception can be seen in the case of long-distance rail services. Under the 
BR structure, the inter-city sector was marginally profitable, on the basis of costing 
system then used (even though it was allocated the great majority of infrastructure costs 
on those routes it shared with regional and freight traffic, on the ‘prime user’ principle). 
However, the separation of infrastructure and rolling stock provision under the 
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framework of rail privatisation (see above) resulted in greatly increased costs, as result 
of which the five principal long-distance franchises all required financial support from 
the state at their inception in 1996/97. An exception to this was the ‘Gatwick Express’ 
service between central London and Gatwick Airport (which had been part of the ‘Inter 
City’ sector under BR ownership, but is now classified with London & South East 
regional franchise operators), which operated commercially from the outset, and has 
paid a premium back to the state (Strategic Rail Authority 2002).  
 
 
Express coach deregulation 
 
The outcome of express coach deregulation in the early 1980s illustrates the rapid 
change that can occur in the long-distance market, especially in price levels. The main 
incumbent operator, National Express (NE, a subsidiary of NBC) faced competition 
from many smaller operators entering the market from October 1980. However, it in 
turn was able to make immediate changes in services and fare levels as a result of 
deregulation, both in response to newcomers in the coach sector, and the railways.  
In contrast, the experience of smaller operator entering the coach market was very 
mixed. Many of their new services did not survive beyond a 2-3 period year after 
deregulation in 1980. While offering low operating costs, and in some cases innovations 
in service quality, they faced difficulty in advertising their product. At that time, much 
coach travel was sold through traditional travel agents, and many new operators did not 
establish such sales outlets from the start of operations. In some cases, a period of loss-
making operation might be necessary in order to build up demand. Even when NE 
increased its fares substantially in the late 1980s, resulting in a substantial loss of traffic 
broadly consistent with the –1.0 elasticity mentioned above, very little new independent 
competition emerged. Subsequent real fares reductions by NE stimulated a recovery in 
its total passenger volume (White 1999). 
While almost all coach services are operated commercially, this sector nonetheless 
offers an interesting example of competitive tendering within the private sector. 
National Express (in England and Wales) and the similar Scottish Citylink network are 
largely operated by vehicles and drivers contracted in from other operators, while 
offering to the public common brand name, through ticketing and an integrated network. 
Contracting operators include regional subsidiaries of major bus groups such as 
Stagecoach, but also smaller independent firms. Hence, advantages may be obtained 
through use of locally-based operators, and competitive bidding to control cost levels 
and stimulate service quality. Revenue risk is taken by the network operator, but 
contractors are appraised on service quality provided as well as costs. Conversely, in the 
local bus market very little of this type of operation is found, contracting occurring at 
the initiative of public sector bodies where commercially-viable services are not 
registered by bus operators. 
 
 
Rail privatisation in the long-distance market 
 
At privatisation, the five major service groups in this sector were franchised 
separately, becoming known by the names of the successful bidders as Great North 
Eastern (GNER), Midland Main Line (MML), Virgin West Coast, Virgin Cross Country 
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and First Great Western (FGW). Aggregate ridership and financial data for this group is 
broadly comparable in definition with that for the intercity sector under BR (apart from 
Gatwick Express as mentioned above). In addition, some other regional franchised train 
operating companies offer long-distance services (for example, Scotrail between major 
Scottish cities). Direct competition between the five major long-distance franchises is 
very limited, although in some cases regional franchises offer competition from parallel 
routes, notably Chiltern Railways between London and Birmingham with Virgin West 
Coast. 
All franchises were awarded as a result of a competitive bidding process, primarily 
geared to offering year-on-year reductions vis a vis the level of financial support offered 
to the corresponding businesses at the time of privatisation. All five long-distance 
franchises required net financial support from the state when they began (although the 
intercity sector had earlier been profitable) as a result of much higher access charges 
(paid to Railtrack) and rolling stock leasing charges than the equivalent costs within the 
integrated BR structure. However, benefiting from substantial ridership and revenue 
growth, GNER and MML were paying a surplus (‘premium’) back to the state by 2001-
02. FGW also greatly reduced the net support required (Strategic Rail Authority 2002). 
All three businesses have been profitable to their owners, after allowing for the net 
effects of franchise payments and premia. By and large existing infrastructure and 
rolling stock has been used, with some additional high-speed trains delivered to MML 
and FGW, and minor infrastructure improvements. New franchises recently awarded to 
GNER and FGW involve substantial and premia being paid over the next ten years, 
clearly assuming large revenue growth, especially in the former. 
A much more mixed pattern has been found in respect of the two Virgin companies, 
whose bidding strategy was based on assumptions of very large ridership and revenue 
growth. These in turn depended on successful implementation of major changes in 
infrastructure and rolling stock to permit much more frequent and faster high speed 
services. Especially in the case of Virgin West Coast, this process was much slower 
than expected, resulting in severe shortfalls in ridership and net revenue vis a vis 
forecast. In 2002 both franchises were re-negotiated with the SRA, with a fixed profit 
margin for the operator (Transit 2006a, 2006b).  
Table 1 shows trends in total rail use for the long-distance services and other sectors. 
Note that growth in the long-distance sector has been lower than in others, especially in 
terms of passenger-km, in part due to strong domestic airline competition. However, the 
higher proportion of costs already covered at the time of privatisation enabled the 
revenue growth to be sufficient to bring some of them into profitability during this 
period. 
In aggregate, ridership on the five main long-distance franchises grew strongly 
between 1997 and 2000, but was then seriously affected by the consequences of a major 
accident at Hatfield (on the GNER route about 30 km north of London). This was 
caused by a failure to maintain track adequately, and resulted in an emergency 
programme of track renewal over much of the network, which severely disrupted long-
distance services. Growth subsequently resumed. Total passenger-km on the five 
franchises rose from 10,100m in 1994/95 to 13,400m in 2004/05 (by 33%). Journeys 
rose somewhat more, from 54m to 84m (i.e. by 55%), indicating a reduction in average 
journey length from about 187 to 160 km, probably associated with a shift for longer 
journeys to air. Further comment on the franchise process as such is made later in this 
paper.  
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Table 1: Trends in Rail Ridership in Britain 1994-95 to 2004-05. 
Year                                      Sector    
  Long-distance    All operators 
 
  Passenger    Passenger        Passenger  Passenger   
  trips (m)      kilometres (‘000 m)      trips (m)    kilometres (‘000m) 
1994-95 54         10.1   735       28.7 
1999-2000 72         13.2              931       38.5 
2004-2005 84         13.4            1088       42.4 
 
% change 
94/95 – 04/05 +55%          +33%             +48%       +47%  
Source : SRA National Trends 2004-04, Tables 1.1b and 1.2b 
 
 
‘Open access’ rail competition 
 
There is also an element of direct competition permitted within the privatised rail 
sector, through the possibility of ‘open access’ operators gaining new services. These 
are train operating companies introducing new services, as distinct from franchises 
based on existing areas of operations, with which they tend to compete. The principal 
example to date is Hull Trains (now a subsidiary of First Group), which introduced a 
through service between Hull and London via the East Coast Main Line (ECML) in 
2000 (Perren 2006). It serves a large regional city otherwise offered only a very limited 
through frequency by GNER, or reliant on connecting services. It has become 
successfully established, enhancing its original frequency and buying new 200 kph 
trains. A further open access operator hoping to start service shortly is Grand Central, 
offering services from Sunderland in North East England, also using the ECML. 
However, a major problem arises in the use of track capacity when such operations 
are introduced. The ECML south of Doncaster (junction for Hull) has limited track 
capacity, used mainly by GNER. Additional operators limit the number of train paths 
available for GNER to expand services, or for freight operations. The issue of track cost 
allocation also arises – franchises bear the existing track costs for routes they serve, 
while open access operators pay a much smaller variable charge (in effect, a lower 
average charge per train-km than the franchised operator). This raises questions of ‘fair’ 
competition – in contrast to Germany, for example, there is no generally-published tariff 
of track access charges in Britain. Additional trains on a congested route also impose an 
‘opportunity cost’ by displacing other trains, as well as direct costs in terms of track 
maintenance, etc. (Nash et al 2004). 
A particular issue in the EMCL case is that GNER has recently won a new franchise 
for a ten-year period, based on assumptions of strong revenue and volume growth, 
linked with additional trains between London and Leeds which will use the London - 
Doncaster section. It is uncertain whether capacity will exist for these, given a decision 
by the Office of Rail Regulation to propose permitting operations by Grand Central. A 
conflict clearly exists in that Network Rail has disputed whether sufficient capacity 
exists on ECML for operations additional to those already planned by GNER, and 
GNER’s own franchise bid was accepted by the government on a basis on additional 
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Leeds services being feasible over the infrastructure available. Different public agencies 
appear to be acting inconsistently in this respect. 
 
Competition in the local transport market 
 
The local transport market is taken here as that within urban areas, and from 
surrounding regions into urban centres. It contrasts with the longer-distance, or 
interurban, market in several respects. Within public transport modes in particular, 
relatively inelastic journey purposes (such as work, and education, etc.) tend to 
dominate, resulting in low overall short-run price elasticity of around –0.4 (Balcombe et 
al 2004). Hence, unless there is very much higher price cross-elasticity between 
operators, overall real fare reductions are unlikely to sustain aggregate revenue levels. 
While demand certainly responds to lower real price levels, this may require substantial 
increases in public expenditure to provide the necessary financial support, as can be 
seen in London since 1999. 
In contrast to long-distance journeys, there is much less tendency by the user to plan 
ahead, although some journeys may display habitual patterns (such as the timing of the 
home to work trip). Given the high frequencies offered on many urban services, the 
rational user will arrive at stops or stations independently of the scheduled timetable, 
since the ‘search time’ taken to compare timetables or other information may be high 
relative to waiting time thereby saved. Where bus services run around 5 times per hour 
or more, this appears to be the general pattern (White, Turner and Mbara 1992). Taking 
a typical revenue per trip of 80 pence (an average allowing for child and off-bus tickets) 
a 25% reduction would bring the average revenue down to 60p, i.e. by 20 pence. 
Although bus users have low values of time, there is strong evidence that a greater 
weighting is attached to walk and wait time. For example, given an in-vehicle value of 
time of £3 per hour (approx Euros 4.50) and a walk/wait time weighting of 1.7 
(Balcombe et al 2004, tables 7.l and 7.14), wait time would be valued at about £5 per 
hour (Euros 7.50), or about 8 pence per minute. Hence, it would be only worthwhile for 
a user to wait an additional 3 minutes to catch the lower-fare bus.  
A parallel may be drawn in this respect with taxi services, in which price competition 
for services hailed on street or at ranks appears to be similarly limited by the search time 
offsetting price benefits. 
There are severe practical limits to the complexity of pricing policy, especially where 
fare collection on the vehicles results in high boarding times, thus affecting service 
speed. In many respects simplified fare structures may stimulate higher ridership by 
improving convenience to the user, although scope certainly exists for peak/off-peak 
differential pricing to spread demand, and for price discrimination by user group (such 
as lower fares for those aged 16-19). 
 
 
Local bus deregulation in Britain 
 
The Transport Act of 1985 introduced a system of ‘deregulation’ from October 1986, 
except in Northern Ireland and Greater London. Instead of the incumbent operator 
receiving direct financial support from local authorities, operators were encouraged to 
register services as ‘commercial’, i.e. at a fare level set by the operator itself, all costs 
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would be covered, without the need for specific financial support. It should be stressed 
that where compensation is paid in respect of revenue foregone due to concessionary 
fares, this is regarded (quite reasonably) as commercial income by the operator, rather 
than a ‘subsidy’. Also, in the British case, bus operators pay a low net rate of fuel duty 
(20% of that applied to other road transport), which effectively reduces total costs by 
around 10%.  
In addition to removing any control of fares for ‘commercial’ services, the Act also 
introduced a simple registration procedure (at the time, requiring 42 days’ notice) 
whereby an operator registers the intended route and timetable, without other operators 
being able to raise objections. Hence, competition was permitted in that more than one 
operator could register a service over the same route, and by the ability of operators to 
specify their own fares. 
It was accepted that not all services could be operated commercially. Where a local 
authority wishes to see services offered that are not registered commercially, it is free to 
specify the service required. Where only a small expenditure is involved, de minimus 
rules apply, i.e. a contract can be negotiated without the need for competitive tendering 
(this might cover, for example, diversion of a rural service via a village off the main 
route). However, in the early years of deregulation in particular, this was a very low 
figure, and the greater majority of tendered services are the subject of a competitive 
bidding process, typically generating around three bids per contract (ATCO 2005). 
There is no compulsion on local authorities to provide a level of service additional to 
those run commercially, except for the obligation to provide free travel between home 
and school for children living above certain distances (3 miles, or 4.8 km, in the case of 
those aged 8 upward). 
In practice, many rural services are secured through a competitive tendering process 
(in some cases combining the school journeys with other services in a single contract). 
The tendering process also applied to some urban services, notably at times of low 
demand (evening and Sundays). Hence, the same route may be operated commercially 
for part of the week, but as a tendered service (and not necessarily by the same operator) 
at other times. 
Overall, about 84% of registered local bus vehicle-km outside London were operated 
commercially, the remaining 16% as contracted services. This proportion remained 
stable for about fifteen years, although it has now risen to about 22% as a result of 
additional rural services being introduced and ‘deregistrations’ of commercial services 
no longer considered viable by their operators. Table 2 indicates trends. 
 
Table 2: Trends in commercial and contracted bus kilometres, Great Britain outside London 
Year   Bus-kilometres   Percentage of total 
    (m)   
  Commercial Contracted  Commercial     Contracted 
 
1990-91  1803    340   84.1   15.9 
1994-95  1937  357   84.4   15.6 
1999-2000       1934  373   83.8   16.2 
2004-05  1689             456   78.3   21.7 
Source: Derived from Transport Statistics Bulletin SB(05)31 ‘Public Transport Statistics Bulletin GB: 
2005 Editon’ Department for Transport, London, September 2006, Annex A, table 3. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 33 (2006): 69-82 
 78
While the extent of direct ’on the road’ competition between bus operators is limited, 
and absent in most areas, it can be argued that the threat of competition, and the 
stimulus to register services as ‘commercial’ certainly helped to stimulate a radical 
reduction in operating costs, which fell by over 40% in real terms per bus-kilometre by 
the late 1990s (an average for the whole network, both commercial and tendered), 
although rising since then (White 2005). 
 
 
The London case 
 
As mentioned above, London is an exception in that bus operations were not 
‘deregulated’ under the 1985 Act, but a system of competitive contracting for services 
was introduced from about the same time. Initially, most bus operations remained under 
public ownership, but subsequently the bus companies owned by London Transport 
were privatised in the early 1990s, competing with each other and with newcomers for 
service contracts. The process of extending competitive contracting over the whole 
network was relatively slow, in contrast to the abrupt changes introduced outside 
London in October 1986. However, almost all services now operate on this basis. The 
only public sector operation remaining is a small company owned directly by Transport 
for London, ‘East Thames Buses’, which can bid competitively with the private sector 
operators and also serves as operator of last resort where private sector operators are 
unwilling to bid, or failed operators have to be replaced at short notice.  
Unlike the deregulated areas, there is no separation of ‘commercial’ and ‘tendered’ 
services, the whole service on each route being the subject of a single contract. Fares 
policy is determined for the network as a whole, enabling a very high proportion of off-
bus ticketing, notably through the use of the ‘Oyster’ smartcard with stored value 
capacity. Very comprehensive passenger information on services is provided by TfL 
The London system can thus be seen as having parallels with National Express in 
offering a single integrated network to the user, while enabling a system of competitive 
bidding to control costs and raise service quality. In the early years, the over-riding 
objective was to minimise costs, but more recently a greater emphasis has been placed 
on improved service quality (especially reliability) through the use of ‘Quality Incentive 
Contracts’ (QICs). A recent review by a scrutiny committee of the London Assembly 
has endorsed this approach (London Assembly 2006). About three bids for each 
contract are now attracted on average, but in some cases competition has been more 
limited. 
A limitation on the degree of competition in London has resulted from the sale of 
existing operating depots with incumbent companies when the London Buses subsidiary 
companies were privatised. Given high property values and difficulties in obtaining 
planning consent, it may be difficult for newcomers to set up new operating centres on a 
substantial scale. In some cases, existing coach operators with operating bases in 
London were well-placed to expand into bus operations (such as Armchair in West 
London). In some cases, TfL has retained ownership of depots, which has assisted 
incoming operators in setting up operations. 
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Rail franchising in regional and London and South East region services 
 
The rail franchising process described above in respect of long-distance operators 
applied in similar form to services in the London & South East region, and in other 
regions. The former comprise franchises based on segments of the radial commuter 
network into London which also operate local services in their areas (such as South 
West Trains, covering routes from the regions south west of London into Waterloo 
terminal), together with one cross-London route, Thameslink, recently incorporated into 
the ‘First Capital Connect’ franchise. The latter comprises networks of services in 
regions outside London, generally serving much lower-density markets even when 
operations in major cities outside London are included (such as Central Trains, covering 
the West Midlands conurbation and a very large rural region in central England). 
The first round of franchises let in 1996/97 was generally based on accepting the bids 
involving the lowest network costs to the government, either in terms of reducing 
subsidy payments, and/or ability to provide premia. Within the London & South East 
region, this approach was generally successful, since services already covered a high 
proportion of costs and substantial ridership growth (associated with increased 
employment and economic activity in London, as well as initiatives by operators) 
provided similar growth in real revenue. Some franchises were able to move into paying 
premia back to the state : Thameslink, and First Great Eastern (SRA 2002). Only in one 
case, Connex South East, did substantial financial problems develop, resulting in 
services reverting to a state-owned operation until being refranchised in 2006 to a new 
private sector operator. 
Conversely, the regional franchises outside London and the trunk routes ran into 
substantial difficulties, and eventually all had to be rescued by the state within the first 
franchise period as a result of optimistic bids. While substantial revenue growth did 
occur, the lower proportion of total costs covered by fares revenue meant that only 
modest reductions in subsidy payments were possible. For example, in the case of a 
London & South East franchise covering 80% of costs from passenger revenue in its 
first year, revenue growth of 25% would enable it to cover all costs. A regional 
franchise covering only 30% of its total costs in the first year would only cover 37.5% 
of its total costs given corresponding revenue growth, and would thus remain highly 
dependent on subsidy. While some cost reductions were possible in franchised 
operations, these were far less dramatic than in the case of bus operations, given that the 
great majority of costs were incurred through access payment to Railtrack, and rolling 
stock leasing, and most changes in financial performance have come about through 
revenue growth. 
Under the second round of franchising, the boundaries of some franchise areas have 
been changed, mainly to enable greater operational integration. For example, three 
operators serving the East Anglia region were merged into a single franchise, now 
operated by the ‘one’ company. The generally strong financial performance of the long-
distance and London & South East operators, especially given further projected revenue 
growth in these sectors, has highlighted the poor financial performance of the regional 
franchises. They now represent the majority of all state financial support to franchised 
operators, but only small share total of passenger-km on rail.  
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Some observations on tendering, franchising and competition policy 
 
In many respects, there is more competition within the public transport industry in 
Britain for the right to operate services than ‘on the road’ (or rail) between operators. 
This applies to almost all bus services in London, the franchising process for national 
rail services and most of the 22% of bus-kilometres in deregulated areas run on contract 
to local authorities (plus the very large school contract market). 
Under such conditions, it may also be easier to displace an operator whose 
performance has proved unsatisfactory through termination of contract and seeking an 
alternative provider, than may be the case in deregulated markets where one operator is 
clearly dominant in an area but is providing a poor service. While in theory other 
operators could then enter the market, in practice doing so on substantial scale may be 
difficult. 
In bidding for a contract (generally applicable to individual routes) or a franchise 
(generally applicable to entire rail networks) a prospective operator needs to make a 
realistic estimate of costs. This would include allowance for possible operating 
efficiency gains, and likely input costs levels (for example, in labour costs), although in 
some cases elements are indexed in contract agreements, such as fuel (ATCO 2005). 
Where only the ‘cost risk’ is being taken, and revenue is treated separately, then the 
contract is generally referred to as a ‘gross cost’ contract, i.e. the operator is paid the 
total operating costs for a specified service, while revenue (if applicable) is received by 
the contracting authority. A long-established example is contracting for school bus 
services, on which passengers are carried free of charge and hence no direct revenue is 
received. This may also be applicable to many other forms of competitive contracting, 
such as road maintenance or refuse disposal. 
In such cases the operator clearly needs to make a sensible estimate of the costs 
involved. Where too low an estimate enables a contract to be obtained, yet costs cannot 
be covered from the anticipated payments, the “winner’s curse” may be said to exist, in 
which the successful bidder ultimately may have to withdraw from provision of the 
service, even where contractual penalties are incurred as result. 
In many cases, the bidding process also involves the ‘revenue risk’ being taken by the 
bidder, i.e. a ‘net cost’ bid is made for the sum required to make up the difference 
between costs and revenues. In theory, this incentivises the operator to maximise 
revenue once a contract has been awarded (for example, through greater attention to 
service quality and marketing), since the revenue gain is received directly. However, 
imposition of greater risk may accentuate the “winner’s curse” effect where over-
optimism has occurred in both cost and revenue calculations – regional rail franchises 
are one example, and the decision by National Express to pull out of a franchise for part 
of the tramway network in Melbourne is another (see Stanley, 2006). In some cases, an 
authority seeking to secure bids may obtain better value for money by using gross cost 
rather than net cost methods, since the former imposes less risk on operators and hence 
smaller firms (often with lower operating costs) may be more inclined to bid (White and 
Tough 1995). 
In the case of rail franchising, bidding has generally been on a ‘net cost’ basis, i.e. 
revenue risk is borne by the operator, except for some urban rail franchises in the first 
round after privatisation. However, this is in the context of a growing market, and the 
ability to spread revenue risk over a substantial network rather than a single route, 
which may be the case with bus service contracts. 
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A further issue arising in the British case has been the role of competition policy. The 
Transport Act of 1985 removed previous exemptions from competition policy as it then 
existed. Subsequent further Acts have greatly strengthened the powers of bodies 
involved in the implementation and enforcement of this policy, notably the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission. Collusive behaviour (such as 
price-fixing or market sharing) is deterred by strong penalties. Which arguments may 
exist for such policies in the economy as a whole to stimulate competition and hence 
efficiency, it is debatable whether their strict application to the public passenger 
transport sector is necessarily appropriate, given the limited scale of ’on the road’ 
competition in practice. Many critics have pointed out the contradiction between the 
strict enforcement of competition policy in Britain with transport policies per se, 
notably those directed to greater co-ordination and of integration of services. Some 
changes have been introduced, notably the ‘Block Exemption’ of the OFT for certain 
types of ticketing, which enables operators to offer interavailable return tickets and 
travelcards, but it remains difficult for operators to co-ordinate services over common 
sections of route. 
A particularly curious feature of the implementation of competition policy has been 
its application to cases of rail franchising after franchises have been allocated, as noted 
by Finney (2006). For example, in the case of recent franchise awards to National 
Express for services throughout East Anglia, and to First for services in Scotland, 
subsequent investigations were mounted by competition authorities into the implications 
for competition within the areas concerned (for example, in respect of National Express 
Group controlling both rail and express coach services in the same region, and First 
running many bus services as well as the rail network in Scotland). At the very least, it 
would seem appropriate for such enquiries to be conducted in advance of, or in parallel 





Britain offers a case in which much greater experience of competition in the public 
transport sector can be seen than in other European countries. This applies in different 
ways in the long-distance and local markets, price competition functioning much more 
effectively in the former. In many respects, the competitive bidding process may be 
seen as more important and extensive than direct inter-operator competition within the 
same mode over the same routes. The degree of risk taken by bidders may be important 
in determining the number of bids received, and the ability to operate for the whole 
duration of a contract. Contradictions between competition policy and wider transport 
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